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Introduction
Abstract (Deutsch)
Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei unabha¨ngigen Artikeln aus dem Forschungsbe-
reich der Informationso¨konomik. Das verbindene Motiv aller Artikel ist die zwei-
schneidige Rolle von Information. In Kontrast zur klassischen Entscheidungstheo-
rie, in der mehr Information Individuen niemals schlechter stellen kann, analysiere
ich drei Marktsituationen, in denen mehr Information scha¨dlich fu¨r Konsumenten
sein kann.
Abstract
This dissertation comprises three independent chapters in the field of information
economics. The recurrent theme of all three chapters is the ambiguous role of
information: While in standard decision theory additional information enables in-
dividuals to weakly increase utility through making better choices, I analyze three
different environments in which more information to consumers may actually be
detrimental to consumer utility.
Introduction
Chapter 1 is concerned with a monopolistic market, where consumers only learn
their valuation for the product over time. As an example one may consider a
consumer buying on an online platform. While the consumer may have some
ex-ante product information prior to trade, many consumer-specific details of the
product remain vague until the consumer receives the good and can properly inspect
it.
I analyze the role of the ex-ante information—the information obtained prior
to the purchasing decision—for consumer surplus in such environments. The effect
of this ex-ante information is ambiguous as it impacts not only the decision of
consumers, but also the price set by the profit maximizing seller. I identify the
2
3optimal amount of ex-ante information from the consumers’ perspective, and show
that it keeps consumers to some extent uninformed about their actual value for the
product. It induces efficient trade and leaves the seller with the same profit as she
would receive under full information.
Further, I emphasize the role of ex-ante information by characterizing, for any
given distribution of buyer valuations, all possible divisions of buyer surplus and
seller surplus arising for different ex-ante information structures. I show that any
surplus pair which satisfies some basic feasibility constraints may arise as a market
outcome.
In Chapter 2, I study the impact of dynamically revealing information in auc-
tions with bidders who are expectation-based loss averse. As experimental evi-
dence suggests, many individuals evaluate losses with respect to their expectations
stronger than gains. I analyze the effect of this expectation-based loss aversion on
bidding behavior in the second-price (Vickrey) auction and in the ascending-clock
(English) auction.
While in both auction formats the highest bidder ultimately wins the auction
and pays the price of the second highest bid, the two auctions differ in the way
information is revealed during the auction. In the Vickrey auction bidders sub-
mit one sealed bid, and only learn more after the auction is resolved, whereas in
the English auction prices are incrementally increased and all bidders continuously
observe which of the opponents are still willing to buy at the current price. Un-
der standard preferences, this information about remaining bidders is immaterial
whenever bidders’ private valuations of the auctioned object do not depend on
other bidders’ valuations: In both formats it is optimal for bidders to respectively
submit or respectively bid up to their private valuation, and thus the seller receives
the same revenue. This result is broadly known as revenue equivalence.
In my work, I show that the revenue equivalence breaks down if bidders are
expectation-based loss averse. Intuitively, while information revelation during the
auction does not affect the intrinsic value of the good, it changes the expectations
of winning. The stronger loss-averse bidders believe they are winning the auction,
the more they are threatened by a potential loss, and the more they are willing
pay in order to reduce that risk. Consequently, the optimal bidding strategy does
not only depend on the value of the good, but also on the evolution of expectation
during the auction process, which differs between the two auction formats.
I show that in equilibrium there is a clear revenue ranking between the two
auction formats: The Vickrey auction always yields strictly higher revenue than
the English auction, a result in line with most of the experimental literature.
For the dynamic model of reference-dependent preferences it is assumed that
4any change in expectations instantaneously gives rise to gains and losses in utility
which can be interpreted as elation and disappointment. As losses weigh stronger
than gains any fluctuation in beliefs will create negative utility in expectation. For
the English auction this implies that the permanent arrival of new information is
in expectation detrimental for bidders’ utility. However, the source of disutility
from detailed information is quite different from that in Chapter 1. In Chapter 1
the ambiguous role of information arises from the strategic interaction with other
market players, while for dynamically loss-averse consumers it is inherently given
by their individual preferences.
In Chapter 3, I analyze the optimal information policy aimed at helping con-
sumers who have self-control problems. Such consumers strongly value instanta-
neous gratification compared to their long-term utility. These preferences lead to
time-inconsistent consumption decisions: Consumers may smoke, drink, or pro-
crastinate due to their present bias, even though they would have liked to commit
to abstention or hard work beforehand.
I contribute to the literature, which analyzes strategic ignorance in such an
environment, i.e. how staying uninformed about the consumption risk can lead
to consumption decisions that are more aligned with a consumer’s long-term pref-
erences. When forming his consumption decision, a consumer faces a trade-off
between the instantaneous consumption utility and the expected future consump-
tion risk. Hence, the consumer’s assessment about his personal risk determines his
consumption decision.
I identify a region of intermediate values of the risk parameter, for which the
consumer would ex-ante like to commit to abstention, but where he consumes under
complete information due to the self-control problem. I then derive the information
signal about the risk parameter, which induces the maximal abstention for this
region. The signal simply provides information on whether the risk parameter
is above or below some threshold. Such a signal may be implement by simple
regulatory measures as threshold-based consumption recommendations, certified
labels, or medical definitions of risk groups.
Furthermore, I show that such a signal can be the informational outcome in an
equilibrium of a dynamic game where the consumer can acquire costless additional
information on the risk parameter before each consumption decision. Intuitively,
while additional information may help the consumer evaluate the instantaneous
gains from consumption, any information is shared with his future selfs, and may
therefore induce a suboptimal high level of future consumption due to the present
bias. As a result, in equilibrium the consumer abstains from any further information
acquisition.
5In this chapter the benefits of strategic ignorance are of a slightly different
nature compared to the other chapters. As consumers cannot commit to future
actions, and consumption decisions are time inconsistent, different incarnations of
the consumer play a dynamic non-cooperative game against each other. Strategic
ignorance provides an advantage in this intra-personal game.
Chapter 1
Consumer-Optimal Information
Design
This Chapter is based on von Wangenheim (2017a).
1.1 Introduction
Over the recent decade, trade has increasingly shifted towards online markets.
Commonly in these markets, consumers do not observe all product characteristics
at the time of purchase. For instance, if a consumer buys clothes he may only
have a vague idea of the cut and the color. If he books a hotel online, he may
learn some coarse information from the hotel’s number of stars or the reviews of
other customers, but many consumer-specific details will remain unclear until his
actual arrival. Consequently, despite having some ex-ante information, the buyer
will learn whether the good matches his private taste sufficiently only ex post, ie.,
after he contracts with the seller and gets access to the good.
A monopolist may exploit this partial uninformedness of the consumer, and offer
contracts which leave only small information rents to consumers. This chapter
addresses the question to what extent regulation that obliges the monopolist to
provide consumer-information, can protect consumers against an exploitation of the
monopolist’s market power. In particular, I derive the buyer-optimal information
design in such markets.
On the simple intuition that more information cannot hurt the buyer, one might
expect that consumer surplus can only be increasing in the amount of buyers’ ex-
ante private information. This is, however, not the case. Since sellers respond
in their contract offers to the structure of buyers’ private information, the choice
of information exhibits a strategic effect on the subsequent contracting game. I
6
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show that the buyer-optimal ex-ante information keeps the buyer to some extent
uninformed about his valuation. The buyer-optimal information signal induces
efficient trade and distributes all rents in excess of the classical static monopoly
profit with fully informed buyers, to the buyer. Moreover, a seller-optimal contract
for the buyer-optimal information always consists of a simple buy-now offer without
refund. In a second step, I characterize all divisions of buyer surplus and seller
surplus that can arise under different information signals for a given prior.
While a buyer may have incomplete information about his value for a product
at the time of contracting, I assume that he learns his exact valuation ex post by
inspecting the product after delivery.1 Due to the sequential information structure,
the seller faces a sequential screening problem. She optimally screens buyers by
offering several contracts, which differ in price and refund conditions, as studied in
Courty and Li (2000).2 I extend their sequential screening framework, by allowing
the buyer to decide how much he wants to learn about his valuation for the good
before contracting. More specifically, the buyer, or the regulator on behalf of the
buyer, first chooses a signal about the valuation for the good. The seller observes
the signal distribution, but not its realization. This assumption expresses that
the seller can observe what the buyer learns, but not how it translates into the
buyer’s valuation.3 Then, the seller offers a contract, before the buyer learns his
true valuation.
The seller screens the buyer with respect to his signal realization. She optimally
offers a menu of option contracts, each specifying a price, and the refund condi-
tions. Intuitively, buyers with higher valuation uncertainty are more attracted by
contracts with high refund flexibility.4
To better understand why a partial information revelation can be beneficial to
the buyer, assume that trade is efficient for all buyer types, and consider the full
information benchmark:
If the buyer learns his exact valuation by choosing a fully informative signal,
there is no further learning. The seller charges the static monopoly price, leaving
an information rent to the buyer. The rent, however, may come at the cost of trade
1Alternatively, assume that inspection only reveals some additional information, and interpret
buyer’s valuation as his updated value estimate. As buyers are risk neutral, this leaves all insights
of the chapter unchanged.
2The optimality of sequential screening also features, among others, in Baron and Besanko
(1984), Battaglini (2005), Eso˝ and Szentes (2007), Hoffmann and Inderst (2011), Kra¨hmer and
Strausz (2011), Nocke et al. (2011), and Pavan et al. (2014).
3I am only interested in product information that relates to subjective taste. By the unraveling
argument of Viscusi (1978), every seller will disclose any information on quality, if he can credibly
and costlessly do so.
4Due to the buyer’s freedom to design information signals, the regularity conditions, imposed
in Courty and Li (2000), may be violated. Thus, we cannot rely on their analysis to find the
optimal contract.
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inefficiencies, since the monopoly price in general induces only high types to buy.
This benchmark naturally lead to the question, whether there is an only par-
tially informative signal that induces efficient trade, and distributes the additional
rents of this more efficient allocation to the buyer. Indeed, I show that for any
prior distribution there is a suitable signal structure, such that the seller chooses a
contract for which
1. trade is efficient, and
2. the seller only receives the static monopoly profit of fully informed buyers.
Note that this static monopoly profit is always a lower bound on the seller’s profit,
since she can always charge the static monopoly price and allow full refund, after
the buyer learns his type. Hence, such a signal is buyer optimal in the sense that
it maximizes the buyer surplus.
The optimal signal keeps low types partly uninformed, while high types have
full information. Indeed, if different low types obtain the same signal, the seller
can sell to these types by providing less information rent, since they have to break
even only on average, rather than individually. Consequently, the seller has an
incentive to lower the price below the static monopoly price, in order to increase
participation. Lower prices increase efficiency as well as rents for high types.
Moreover, I fully characterize the possible combinations of buyer surplus and
seller surplus that can arise in the sequential screening model for different signal
distributions. Similar to Bergemann et al. (2015), I show that the only limits are
imposed by the natural constraints that
1. buyer utility is nonnegative,
2. the seller receives at least the static monopoly profit, and
3. aggregate surplus does not exceed the first-best gains from trade.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: After discussing the
relevant literature in Section 1.2, I introduce the model in Section 1.3. Section
1.4 covers the case of a uniform distribution and provides an illustrative example.
In Section 1.5, I construct the buyer-optimal signal. Section 1.6 characterizes all
possible surplus division, before Section 1.7 concludes the chapter. All proofs are
relegated to the appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on dynamic mechanism design,
in which private information is learned over time. Baron and Besanko (1984)
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were the first to study dynamic price discrimination in a two-period procurement
model with auditing. My model builds on the framework of Courty and Li (2000)
who analyze optimal price discrimination for monopolistic markets in a two-period
model. Battaglini (2005) and Pavan et al. (2014) provide general models on optimal
dynamic mechanism design for longer time horizons.
A recent branch of the literature, building on the pioneer work of Lewis and
Sappington (1994), studies sellers’ strategic information revelation. Bergemann
and Pesendorfer (2007) analyze auctions, where the seller can choose the accuracy
by which the buyers learn their private valuations. They identify a trade-off be-
tween allocation efficiency and information rents. Eso˝ and Szentes (2007) show
that the trade-off disappears when the information provision is part of the con-
tractual relationship, and argue that the seller should always disclose all relevant
information. Li and Shi (2017) show that this no longer holds when the seller can
use discriminatory information disclosure. If buyers have different ex ante types,
and the provided information can depend to the reported types then partial in-
formation disclosure may be optimal. Hoffmann and Inderst (2011) characterize
optimal contracts for the case where the buyer’s and the seller’s information are
stochastically independent.
This chapter conversely analyzes buyers’ optimal information acquisition. The
agent may acquire private information costlessly and observably before the contrac-
tual relationship, to obtain a strategic advantage in the contracting game. This
timing is in contrast to the classical literature on buyer’s information acquisition
in principal-agent relationships, where the principle aims to contractually provide
incentives for costly learning.5
The model is probably closest related to Roesler and Szentes (2017), who char-
acterize the buyer-optimal signal in a classical static one-unit trade environment.
In contrast to their setup, I assume that after delivery the buyer receives addi-
tional information that affects his valuation. As a result, the seller may combine
the contract with refund options, which—different to Roesler and Szentes—induces
a lower bound on seller profit, and results in efficient trade for the buyer optimal
signal. I consider my framework to be more appropriate in the context such as
internet markets, where consumer typically receive additional information upon
the good’s delivery (see Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2011)), while the context of Roesler
and Szentes seems more appropriate in markets in which this learning effect is
negligable.
Kessler (1998) analyzes the value of ignorance in a classical adverse selection
5E.g., Lewis and Sappington (1997), Cre´mer et al. (1998), Szalay (2009), Kra¨hmer and Strausz
(2011).
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model with two types. She finds that, even if the agent can learn his type costlessly,
he will choose a signal that is uninformative with some positive probability, in order
to receive a more favorable contract.
Bergemann et al. (2015) analyze trading contracts, where the seller has infor-
mation beyond the prior distribution. In particular, they characterize the buyer-
optimal seller information structure. In contrast to my model the seller receives
a signal, while the buyer is fully informed. In my model, the seller has to elicit
information on the signal via an incentive compatible mechanism.
The idea that one party can choose arbitrary information signals to influence
another party’s decision has lately drawn a lot of attention, and produced a vast
literature on Bayesian persuasion, based on the work of Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011). My setup is different from persuasion, since the buyer himself is unin-
formed. We can, however, make use of the tools from the framework of arbitrary
signal choices. (One interpretation of my model is that the buyer tries to “per-
suade” himself, in the sense that he wants to manipulate his beliefs to obtain a
strategic advantage towards the seller.)
1.3 The model
A seller can produce one unit of a good at zero cost. The valuation of the good
for a buyer is drawn from a commonly known prior distribution F (θ) on some
positive support [θ, θ] with positive, continuous density f(θ).6 Before contracting
and learning the valuation, the buyer (or the regulator in the buyer’s interest) can
choose a signal structure to gain some information on the valuation. The signal
distribution is commonly observed, the realization is private information to the
buyer. I allow for any general signal structure in form of a Borel-measurable signal
space T ⊆ R, together with a probability measure µ on the Borel σ-algebra of
[θ, θ]×T . The buyer observes a signal τ ∈ T , which is distributed according to the
signal distribution
G(τ) =
∫
t≤τ
∫
θ∈[θ,θ]
1(t, θ)dµ.
The only restriction on the signal is the “consistency” with the prior F in the sense
that ∫
T×[θ,θ]
1dµ = F (θ)
6The restriction to a positive support is only to keep the exposition transparent and tractable.
It does not change the results. Indeed, if trade is inefficient for some buyer types, one can interpret
an optimal learning process as a two step procedure. First the buyer learns whether θ > 0, and
then applies the optimal learning process described in this chapter to the conditional distribution
on θ being larger than 0.
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for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].7
The setup includes the common examples of a finite signal space T = {τ1, ..., τn}
with pi = Prob(τi), and the restriction that
n∑
i=1
F (θ|τi)pi = F (θ),
as well as a continuous signal space T = [τ , τ ] with some distribution G(τ), and
the restriction that ∫
[τ ,τ ]
F (θ|τ)dG(τ) = F (θ).
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. the buyer publicly chooses a signal structure
2. the signal realization is privately observed by the buyer
3. the seller offers a contract, the buyer accepts / rejects
4. the buyer observes his type
5. transfers are made according to the rules of the contract
For any signal structure that reveals at least some information to the buyer, the
seller in Stage 3 faces a classical sequential screening problem, as described in
Courty and Li (2000). They show that any optimal deterministic contract can be
implemented as a menu of option contracts from which the buyer can choose at the
contracting stage. An option contract specifies an upfront payment a to the seller,
and an option price p, for which the buyer can decide to buy, after he learns his
true valuation.8
In the following section, I derive the buyer-optimal signal, which achieves the
upper bound of buyer utility, for a uniform prior. In Section 3.1, I show how the
construction generalizes to arbitrary prior distributions if we restrict the seller to
the use of option contracts.
1.4 The Uniform Case
It is instructive to analyze first the case of a uniform prior, as it catches the main
intuitions.
7We explicitly do not make common restrictions on the signal distribution, such as non-shifting
support or an order by first-order stochastic dominance.
8Equivalently, one can interpret such a contract as a buy price of a + p, together with the
option to return the good for a refund of p.
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Let the prior F (θ) be the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Consider, as a bench-
mark, that the buyer fully learns his type θ under signal τ . The seller will then
charge the monopoly price of
pM = arg max
p
p(1− F (p)) = 1/2.
She will therefore sell to the buyer if and only if the buyer’s valuation exceeds 1/2.
The seller’s profit is piM = 1/4, while the buyer’s expected surplus is 1/8.
Note that the seller can always ignore the possibility to exploit the signal for
ex-ante screening, and just charge the monopoly price after the buyer learns the
true valuation, i.e. (a, p) = (0, pm). Hence, the static monopoly profit of piM = 1/4
defines a lower bound for the seller’s utility.
Since trade is always efficient, the upper bound for buyer surplus is achieved, if
trade always occurs, and the seller is left with her monopoly profit piM . The main
result of this section is that such a contract can be induced by the following signal.
τ(θ) =
0, θ ≤ 12 ,θ, θ > 12 . (1.1)
The buyer only learns his valuation if it is above 1/2. Buyers with valuation below
1/2 are pooled in one signal of τ = 0, which induces an expected valuation of
E[θ|τ = 0] = 1/4.
Suppose the seller offers a single contract (a, p) = (1/4, 0), which means she
offers the good at a price of 1/4 before the buyer learns θ with certainty. Since
E[θ|τ ] ≥ 1/4 for all τ , this offer will attract all buyers. Using the tools of mechanism
design, I show in the appendix that, given this signal structure, there is no contract
that generates a higher seller utility.
Proposition 1.1. Given signal τ , there is no mechanism which generates a seller
utility above 14 . In particular, the contract (
1
4 , 0), which sells to all buyers ex ante
at a price of 14 , is a seller-optimal trading mechanism.
Since the seller is left with her lower bound utility of 1/4, and social surplus is
maximized, the signal τ implements the upper bound of buyer utility. It is therefore
a buyer-optimal signal.
Even though the above construction of the optimal signal is specific to the uni-
form distribution, the main intuitions from this example carry over to the general
case. It is suboptimal for the buyer to be fully informed about his valuation. If
buyers with relatively low valuations remain partly uninformed, then the seller has
to provide less information rent to sell to these types. To include lower types in
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trade, the seller must set low prices for all buyers. While low types’ individual ra-
tionality constraints bind, and they make zero profits on average, high types benefit
from lower prices and buyer surplus increases. Since more types trade, efficiency
increases as well.
Applications and Discussion
There are numerous ways in which a regulator or intermediary can control the
amount of product information exposed to consumers prior to trade.
One natural application for the use of information design are internet platforms.
Especially in the hospitality and travelling industry it is common to offer car rentals,
holiday packages, hotel stays, or airline tickets on internet platforms, such as online
travel agencies.9 By collecting personalized data, platforms can gather a profound
understanding of consumers preferences. Further, they are able to discriminate
product information with respect to individual consumers.
If the platform has to grant standard monopoly profits to hotels, but aims
to maximize consumer surplus due to platform competition, it faces exactly the
information design problem described in the model. As seen in Proposition 1.1 and
generalized in Theorem 1.1, the platform optimally does not provide all product
details to consumers, but leaves details of the deal somewhat opaque, and sells
at low prices. Indeed, such “opaque deals”, are common practice in online travel
agencies such as priceline and hotwire: The platforms offer discounted deals, which
guarantee specific features such as the number of hotel stars or location at the city
center, but reveal the identity and other details of the hotel only after payment.10
Note that in contrast to Shapiro and Shi (2008) and Balestrieri et al. (2015),
where opaque selling is a result of firm’s profit maximizing behavior, in my model it
appears as the natural tool to maximize consumer surplus, which provides a novel
perspective for the use of opaque goods.11
Alternatively, a regulator may control the amount of product information by
specific labelling requirements, certification standards, or—as Hoffmann et al. (2017)
argue— by regulating the length of trial periods.
For instance, both the USA and the EU require sellers to label food ingredients
on the package in descending order of predominance by weight, yet not by the exact
9According to Green and Lomanno (2012), in 2010 about 11 percent of all revenues in the US
hotel industry were generated by online travel agencies like Expedia, Priceline, and Orbitz.
10Green and Lomanno (2012) find that about one quarter of all hotel bookings in online travel
agencies involve opaque goods.
11In Shapiro and Shi (2008), opaque selling arises as an equilibrium under competition with
differentiated consumers, whereas Balestrieri et al. (2015) show that a monopolist’s optimal selling
strategy for substitutes may feature opaque options.
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amount.12 The same EU regulation requires firms to label the nutrition value with a
Guideline Daily Amount (GDA), however Grunert et al. (2010) find that only about
70 percent of customers have a conceptional understanding of its meaning. They
find that the understanding is positively correlated with the interest in healthy
eating, which suggests that the information design is particularly informative to
consumers who have a high value for healthy food.
A different information design approach is taken by the Food Standard Agency
(FSA) in the UK. In 2006 they introduced the traffic light rating system, un-
der which nutrition values—such as sugar or saturated fat—are highlighted in red
(high), amber (medium) or green (low). In their literature review on food labelling
Hawley et al. (2013) conclude that traffic light ratings have “most consistently
helped consumers to identify healthier products”.
The following example depicts how certification regulation may provide indi-
vidual consumers with the information signal that generates the consumer-optimal
information structure.
Example: Hotel Certifications
This stylized example aims to illustrate that, in the terms of this chapter, the
current european system of hotel certification can be understood as providing con-
sumers with only partial information. The example, however, also serves to show
that, based on this chapter’s arguments, the information provision underlying the
certification—designed by the hotel associations—is not consumer optimal. The
consumer-optimal information regulation is derived.
In 2009 hotel associations from seven European countries founded the “Hotel-
stars Union” to harmonize the national standards of hotel certifications. By 2017
the system was adapted by 17 countries within the European Union, with only very
slight differences between participating countries.
The grading system mainly consists of five different quality levels, represented
by one to five stars13. Participating hotels gather points by providing features from
a list of over 200 possible criteria, divided into categories as reception, services,
gastronomy, and leisure. Hotels who want to certify a certain number of stars
must achieve a respective number of points. Besides some minimum requirements
for each star, hotels are entirely free in how to achieve the number of points.
While the number of stars may be a good measure for the overall hotel quality,
it is quite uninformative about the match value with respect to private taste. While
12USA: 21CFR §101.4, EU: Regulation 1169/2011
13Sometimes there are intermediate grades denoted with the label “superior”, in addition to the
number of stars, for details on the national certification gradings see https://www.hotelstars.eu/
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business travellers may be exceptionally concerned about reception opening hours
and good Wi-Fi, leisure travellers may have a higher valuation for available sports
equipment and wellness services.
For the following example, consider a hotel that has certified a certain number
of stars. Guests who consider to book online can infer from the number of stars
alone only how many total points the hotel achieved in the grading system. The
provided features remain unknown to the guests until they arrive at the hotel and
can inspect it.
Potential guests g are—with equal probability—either of type business (g = B),
which only care about features in the categories reception and services, or of type
leisure (g = L), which only care about features in the categories gastronomy and
leisure. Moreover, any type g ∈ {B,L} has private preferences over the specific
features within her relevant categories, which can be represented by a location xg
on the circumference of a circle with perimeter one (Salop’s circle). Assume for each
type g ∈ {B,L} that the location is uniformly distributed on the circumference.
Guests are risk neutral and the realization of (g, xg) is their private information.
The hotel h provides—with equal probability—either mainly features for the
business type (focus h = B), or mainly for the leisure type (focus h = L). The
exact features that the hotel offers for each, business and leisure type, may be
represented by two locations (yB, yL) on the circumferences of two distinct circles,
each with perimeter one. Assume, again, that yB and yL are each ex ante uniformly
distributed on their circumference. Marginal costs for additional guests are zero.
The values of (h, yB, yL) are private information of the hotel, but become observable
after the guest arrives at the hotel.
Let the utility of a guest (g, xg) who pays price p to stay in a hotel (h, yB, yL)
be given by
u((g, xg), (h, yB, yL), p) = 0.5 · 1g=h + (0.5− d(xg, yg))− p,
where d(xg, yg) ∈ [0, 0.5] describes the distance of xg and yg on the circumference
of the circle. In other words, the guest receives a utility of 0.5 if the hotel has a
focus suitable for his type, and an additional utility up to 0.5 if the hotel offers
preferred features within the relevant categories. As neither the guest nor the hotel
have ex ante any information on the match value, the value is ex ante uniformly
distributed on [0, 1], with values in [0, 0.5] for types g 6= h and values in [0.5, 1] for
types g = h.
Since guests’ valuation is ex ante uniform on [0, 1] they have an expected value
of 0.5. The hotel can set p = 0.5 without refund option, and all guests will accept
the offer, leading to an efficient outcome where all rents are realized by the hotel.
16 1.5. THE GENERAL CASE
Consider now the role of a regulator who is solely interested in consumer surplus
and has the power to precisely regulate the information the hotel has to provide
online. If the regulator forces the hotel to disclose its focus h ∈ {B,L}, as well as
the available features only in its focal categories—thus the exact position of yh—
the guest receives a signal exactly as defined in (1.1): Guest types g = h with a
valuation above 0.5 learn their exact valuation as they learn the hotel’s position
yg, while guest types g 6= h don’t learn the relevant position yg and remain pooled
with valuations in [0, 0.5]. As we have seen in Proposition 1.1, such a signal is
guest-optimal, and implements the upper bound of the guests’ utility.
The intuition of the example is simple: The regulator should exclusively allow
information that is relevant to high types. High types receive high information
rents, while the low types, who are relatively uninformed, induce the seller to set
low prices.
1.5 The General Case
The main result of the chapter is that the buyer can achieve his first-best for any
arbitrary prior distribution:
Theorem 1.1. Let piM be the standard static monopoly profit the seller can achieve
if the buyer privately learns his valuation before contracting. Then there exists an
information signal such that for the seller’s optimal menu of option contracts
• trade is efficient, and
• the seller receives piM .
Such a signal is buyer-optimal, since it maximizes aggregate surplus and leaves
the seller with her lower bound of utility piM .
The result follows immediately from the more general Theorem 1.2. I will,
however, provide the intuition how to construct such a signal structure.
If a menu of contracts induces trade for all types θ, then each type will trade at
the lowest available total payment a+p. This means that any signal which induces
full trade and a seller profit of piM must necessarily sell to all buyers at a uniform
price of a+ p = piM .
We start by defining y as the type such that
E[θ|θ ≤ y] = piM .
Consider first a signal structure similar as that defined in Equation (1.1) of Section
1.4, where types above y learn their valuation, while types θ ≤ y are pooled in one
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signal realization. By construction, the pooled buyers are ex ante willing to pay at
most piM for the good. Therefore, a uniform ex ante price of piM would attract all
buyers, and the seller would make monopoly profit piM .
However, for many prior distributions F such a uniform price with full partic-
ipation is suboptimal for the seller, given the signal. The seller may make higher
profit, if she chooses to exclude types below some threshold θˆ < y from trade. She
could achieve this for example with a menu offer ofM = {(a, θˆ)}, where a is chosen
such that types θ ≤ y in the pooling area receive a utility of zero in expectation.
Such a contract comes at the cost of losing the participation of types θ < θˆ, but at
the gain of higher prices and thus more revenue from all types θ > y.
One can modify the signal structure such that such contracts are never optimal.
The idea is to give buyers more information by maintaining the property that
E[θ|τ ] = piM for all θ ≤ y. Figure 1.1 illustrates how to achieve this goal.
Figure 1.1: Partition of the optimal signal structure (stylized)
Types above y fully learn their valuation, while types below y learn that their
type is in a certain pooling region, represented by the shade of gray, assigned to
their type in Figure 1.1. The shaded areas are constructed in such a way that for
any shade signal τ
E[θ|τ ] = piM .
Further, if τ1 is darker than τ0, then F (·|τ1) is a mean preserving spread of F (·|τ0).
Now, we let the area of each shade signal shrink, while we let the number of different
shades goes to infinity. In the limit, we obtain a continuum of shades, where each
signal τ only pools two types {θLτ , θHτ } with θLτ < piM < θHτ , and E[θ|τ ] = piM .
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If the seller now aims to sell to any type θˆ < piM , then—by ex ante individual
rationality—she has to offer a contract that charges at most a + p = E[θ|τ(θ) =
τ(θ˜)] = piM . Such a contract would attract all types, and generate a profit of piM
to the seller. It turns out, this is the best the seller can do: suppose that the seller
aims for higher prices at the cost of participation. If it were optimal for the seller
to use a menu for which the lowest type that buys satisfies θˆ > piM , then one can
show that the best the seller could do is to offer a contract (0, θˆ). Such a contract
is equivalent to an ex post take-it-or-leave-it offer with price θˆ, which certainly
cannot generate more profit to the seller than the optimal static monopoly price
with fully informed buyers.
1.6 The Limits of Surplus Distribution
In the previous section, I have analyzed a signal which maximizes buyer surplus.
In this section, I characterize which combinations of buyer surplus and seller sur-
plus are feasible in a sequential screening framework. Similarly to Bergemann et al.
(2015), Figure 1.2 characterizes the natural constraints to this problem graphically.
Figure 1.2: All potential pairs of surplus division
First of all, by buyer’s individual rationality, expected buyer surplus will never
be negative. Second, as argued in the previous section, seller surplus can never fall
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below the static monopoly profit, since the seller can always use a static mechanism
after the buyer learned his true type. Finally, aggregate surplus cannot exceed first-
best welfare, which is sketched as the diagonal pareto frontier. Consequently, any
surplus pair must lie in the gray shaded triangle. Point A corresponds to the
buyer-optimal signal, as constructed in Section 3.1. Point B corresponds to the
case, where the seller has no ex ante information upon the prior distribution. In
this case, the seller can extract the entire surplus by selling ex ante at a price of
E[θ].
We will see that any arbitrary point C in the triangle can be implemented as
the solution to the seller’s problem for an appropriate signal distribution.
Theorem 1.2. There exists a signal and an optimal sequential selling mechanism
with seller surplus uS and buyer surplus uB if and only if
• uB ≥ 0,
• uS ≥ piM , and
• uS + uB ≤ E[θ],
where piM is the standard static monopoly profit the seller can achieve, if the buyer
has full information.
A full proof can be found in the appendix. I will sketch the main steps here.
Take an arbitrary surplus pair (BS, SS) which satisfies the above constraints. We
will construct a corresponding signal, such that, indeed, buyer surplus and seller
surplus are given by (uB, uS) = (BS, SS).
Call AS = BS + SS the aggregate surplus we want to construct. Define the
threshold x by
AS =
∫ θ
x
f(θ)θdθ = (1− F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, θ]].
Note that the gains from trade uS +uB are indeed given by AS, if we can construct
a signal for which exactly all types above x trade.
Next, we define the threshold y ≤ θ by
SS = (1− F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, y]].
Further, define a ∈ [x, y] by
a := E[θ|θ ∈ [x, y].
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We will use a similar construction as in Section 3.1 to build a signal for which the
seller chooses to sell ex ante to all types θ ≥ x at a uniform price of a. In this case,
seller surplus uS is indeed given by SS, and buyer surplus is uB = AS−SS = BS.
Figure 1.3: The signal to induce (uB, uS) = (BS, SS)
Figure 1.3 depicts the construction of the signal structure. Types below x and
above y fully learn their valuation. Types in the interval [x, y] again learn their
pooling region that is assigned to their type, illustrated by the corresponding shade
of grey. The shaded areas are constructed in such a way, that for any shade signal
τ we have
E[θ|τ ] = a.
If we let the number of different shades go to infinity, we obtain a continuum of
shades. In the limit, the signal can be represented by
τ(θ) =

θ − θ, θ < x,∫ a
θ f(s)(a− s)ds, θ ∈ [x, y],
θ, θ > y.
While types θ /∈ [x, y] learn their valuation, the signal τ(θ) for each θ ∈ [x, y] cor-
responds to exactly two types {θLτ , θHτ }, which satisfy θLτ ≤ a ≤ θHτ , and E[θ|τ ] = a.
Figure 1.4 depicts signal τ as a function of θ.
Now, consider an optimal menu of contracts, the seller will offer to the buyer.
Let θˆ be the lowest type which buys given this menu. If θˆ /∈ [x, y], then the buyer
learns θˆ with certainty under τ , and the seller can charge at most a+p = θˆ from this
type. Since this contract is available to all types, expected profits cannot exceed
(1− F (θˆ))θˆ ≤ max
p
{(1− F (p))p} = piM ≤ SS.
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Figure 1.4: Signal τ(θ) for the distribution in Figure 1.3 (stylized)
The seller can do (weakly) better if she decides to sell ex ante to all types in [x, y].
Since for all these types we have E[θ|τ ] = a, a contract (a, p) = (a, 0) attracts
exactly all types θ ≥ x, and seller’s profit is (1−F (x))a = SS. One can show that
this contract is indeed optimal from the seller’s perspective.
The boundaries x and y define three partitions of types. In the optimal contract,
types θ < x don’t trade and therefore induce an efficiency loss. Types θ ∈ [x, y]
trade, but make no surplus in expectation. Buyers θ > y receive an information
rent and extract the entire buyer surplus. Intuitively, by moving the boundaries
x and y one can realize any buyer and seller surplus that satisfies the natural
constraints in Theorem 1.2.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter emphasizes the role of private information in sequential screening.
It shows that there are almost no restrictions to the division of buyer and seller
surplus, that can arise in sequential screening for different ex-ante information.
The buyer-optimal signal keeps the buyer to some extent uninformed about his
valuation at the time of contracting. Thus, the ability of a monopolist to screen
buyers sequentially may not necessarily harm consumers, but lead to lower prices,
and increase efficiency.
It is worth noting that the European Union has taken a clear stand on the issue
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of consumer rights in online markets. By Directive 2011/83/EU, any consumer is
granted the right to withdraw from online contracts within 14 days after delivery.
As Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2015) point out, this policy effectively destroys the ability
of a monopolist to screen ex ante, granting the consumers the same information
rent, as under full information.14,15 This chapter shows, that regulators, who care
about consumer utility, can improve on this regulation, if they have sufficent control
over information provided to individual buyers. The regulation of information
may be more flexible and powerful than the regulation of contracts, and therefore
deserves further study.
1.8 Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1.1. By the revelation principle for dynamic games (e.g., My-
erson (1986)), we can restrict attention to direct, incentive compatible mechanisms:
The buyer reports his private information sequentially. After learning τ , he
reports its realization to the seller. If τ ∈ (0.5, 1] then τ = θ, thus a truthful report
of τ reveals θ already. If the buyer reports τ = 0 then the seller asks for a report
of θ ∈ [0, 0.5] after the buyer observes its realization.16
A direct mechanism specifies the trading rules as a function of the buyer’s
reports. Formally, the allocation rule
q : ({0} × [0, 0.5]) ∪ (0.5, 1]→ [0, 1],
assigns to each complete report a probability of receiving the good. The transfer
rule
t : ({0} × [0, 0.5]) ∪ (0.5, 1]→ R,
assigns to each complete report a monetary transfer from the agent to the principal.
Note that since τ defines a partition on θ, each feasible report corresponds
exactly to one claim of being some type θ ∈ [0, 1]. Identifying the report space
14Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2015) already find that the welfare effect of such a policy is ambiguous,
and depends on consumers’ ex ante private information.
15The buyer can be forced to bear the shipping cost of returning the good, so there may be
scope for ex-ante screening to some very limited extent.
16In Myerson (1986), the agent’s report space is the entire support of his private information
at each stage. That is, if the agent lies about the value of τ , he may still report θ truthfully and
inconsistent with the report of τ . Since in our case τ defines a partition on all types θ, however, the
seller can immediately detect and punish any untruthful report (τ, θ) with τ(θ) 6= θ, such that the
buyer would never choose such a report. It is therefore without loss of generality to consider only
direct mechanisms, which restrict the reports of θ to values that are admissible for the reported
τ .
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with the type space, let
u(θˆ|θ) = θq(θˆ)− t(θˆ)
be the utility of buyer of type θ reporting as if being type θˆ. Let us further
simplify notation by u(θ) := u(θ|θ). The incentive constraints, which guarantee
truthful reporting, read
∀θ ∈ (0.5, 1], θˆ ∈ [0, 1] u(θ) ≥ u(θˆ|θ) (IC τ 6= 0)
∀θˆ ∈ [0.5, 1] E[u(θ)|τ = 0] ≥ E[u(θˆ|θ)|τ = 0] (IC τ = 0)
∀θ ∈ [0, 0.5], θˆ ∈ [0, 0.5] u(θ) ≥ u(θˆ|θ). (IC θ)
First period individual rationality reads
∀θ ∈ [0.5, 1] u(θ) ≥ 0 (IR τ 6= 0)
E[u(θ)|τ = 0] ≥ 0 (IR τ = 0)
Since the seller’s utility equals social surplus minus buyer’s utility, her program
is
P : max
(q,t)
∫ 1
0
(θq(θ)− u(θ))dθ
s.t. (IC τ 6= 0),(IC τ = 0),(IC θ),(IR τ 6= 0),(IR τ = 0).
We will derive the optimum for a so called “relaxed” problem P ′ with less
constraints, and verify ex post that the remaining constraints are satisfied for the
derived solution. The constraint (IC τ 6= 0) directly implies the weaker condition
∀θ ∈ (0.5, 1], θˆ ∈ [0.5, 1] u(θ) ≥ u(θˆ|θ). (IC’ τ 6= 0)
We now define
P ′ : max
(q,t)
∫ 1
0
(θq(θ)− u(θ))dθ
s.t. (IC’ τ 6= 0),(IC θ),(IR τ = 0).
The solution to program P ′ must implement weakly higher seller surplus than
program P, as it faces less constraints.
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By Revenue Equivalence (e.g., Myerson (1981)), (IC θ) is equivalent to
1. q(θ) is increasing on [0, 0.5], and
2. u(θ) = u(0) +
∫ θ
0 q(s)ds for all θ ∈ [0, 0.5].
From 2. it follows that
u(θ) = u(0.5)−
∫ 0.5
θ
q(s)ds.
Further, in any optimal solution, (IR τ = 0) must bind, because otherwise the
seller could uniformly raise the transfer for all types. Using integration by parts
we obtain
0 =
∫ 0.5
0
u(θ)dθ
=
∫ 0.5
0
(
u(0.5)−
∫ 0.5
θ
q(s)ds
)
dθ
= 0.5u(0.5)−
[
θ
∫ 0.5
θ
q(s)ds
]0.5
0
+
∫ 0.5
0
−θq(θ)dθ
= 0.5u(0.5)−
∫ 0.5
0
θq(θ)dθ,
or equivalently
0.5u(0.5) =
∫ 0.5
0
θq(θ)dθ. (1.2)
Again by Revenue Equivalence, (IC’ τ 6= 0) implies that on any closed interval
[θ˜, 1] ⊂ (0.5, 1], the allocation q(θ) is weakly increasing, and further for any θ ∈ [θ˜, 1]
u(θ) = u(θ˜) +
∫ θ
θ˜
q(s)ds.
Therefore, u(θ) is continuous on (0.5, 1], and, because q(θ) is weakly positive and
bounded, limθ↘0.5 u(θ) exists. Since by (IC’ τ 6= 0) for all θ ∈ (0.5, 1]
u(θ) ≥ u(0.5, θ) = (θ − 0.5)q(0.5) + u(0.5) ≥ u(0.5),
we have necessarily
lim
θ↘0.5
u(θ) ≥ u(0.5).
Moreover, if we had limθ↘0.5 u(θ) = u(0.5) + ε, for some ε > 0, the seller could
increase all transfers of types θ ∈ (0.5, 1] uniformly by ε and still satisfy all con-
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straints of P ′. A mechanism with limθ↘0.5 u(θ) > u(0.5) can therefore not be
optimal. It follows that any solution to P ′ must satisfy
u(θ) = u(0.5) +
∫ θ
0.5
q(s)ds
for all θ ∈ [0.5, 1].
For the seller’s objective function in P ′ we obtain∫ 1
0
(θq(θ)− u(θ))dθ =
∫ 1
0
θq(θ)dθ −
∫ 0.5
0
u(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
∫ 1
0.5
u(θ)dθ
=
∫ 1
0
θq(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
0.5
(
u(0.5) +
∫ θ
0.5
q(s)ds
)
dθ
=
∫ 1
0
θq(θ)dθ − 0.5u(0.5)−
∫ 1
0.5
∫ θ
0.5
q(s)dsdθ
(1.2)
=
∫ 1
0
θq(θ)dθ −
∫ 0.5
0
θq(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
0.5
∫ θ
0.5
q(s)dsdθ
=
∫ 1
0.5
θq(θ)dθ −
[
θ
∫ θ
0.5
q(s)ds
]1
0.5
+
∫ 1
0.5
θq(θ)dθ
=
∫ 1
0.5
θq(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
0.5
q(s)ds+
∫ 1
0.5
θq(θ)dθ
=
∫ 1
0.5
(2θ − 1)q(θ)dθ.
Note that the seller’s utility is independent of the allocation for types θ ≤ 0.5.
Indeed, any attempt to increase surplus from these types equally increases the
information rent the seller has to provide to types θ ∈ [0.5, 1].
Since (2θ−1) > 0 for θ > 0.5, the seller maximizes her utility by setting q(θ) = 1
for any θ > 0.5. The seller’s maximal utility under P ′ therefore is∫ 1
0.5
(2θ − 1)dθ = [θ2 − θ]10.5 = 0.25.
If the seller chooses to set q(θ) = 1 for all θ ≤ 0.5 then the direct mechanism takes
the form
q(θ) ≡ 1,
and
t(θ) ≡ 0.25,
which corresponds exactly to the offer to sell the product ex ante at a uniform price
of 0.25. Since all buyer types obtain the same offer in this contract, it satisfies all
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incentive constraints of P. Moreover, the contract yields positive profit for all
θ ≥ 0, therefore it satisfies the constraint (IR τ 6= 0) of program P as well.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Take some arbitrary SS ≥ piM and BS ≥ 0, with
BS + SS ≤ E[θ]. We need to construct a signal such that the seller’s optimal
mechanism induces seller utility uS = SS and buyer utility uB = BS.
Constructing the signal
Define x implicitly by
BS + SS =
∫ θ
x
θdF (θ) = (1− F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, θ]]. (1.3)
Since f has full support, the right hand side is strictly decreasing in x for x ∈ [θ, θ],
with
∫ θ
θ θdF (θ) = E[θ], and
∫ θ
θ θdF (θ) = 0. Since
0 < BS + SS ≤ E[θ],
there is exactly one x ∈ [θ, θ], for which (1.3) is satisfied.17
Define now y implicitly by
SS = (1− F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, y]]. (1.4)
The right hand side is strictly increasing in y and since
(1−F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, x]] = (1−F (x))x ≤ piM ≤ SS ≤ BS+SS = (1−F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, θ]],
there is exactly one y ∈ [x, θ], which satisfies (1.4). Further, we call
a := E[θ|θ ∈ [x, y]].
Finally, we define the following signal structure:
τ(θ) =

θ − θ, θ < x,∫ a
θ f(s)(a− s)ds, θ ∈ [x, y],
θ, θ > y.
The signal prescribes full learning for θ < x and θ > y. For θ ∈ [x, y] the function
τ(θ) is continuous and strictly decreasing on [x, a], and strictly increasing on [a, y],
17The assumption that F is continuous and increasing is innocuous and only for mathematical
convenience. If F has atoms, then τ(θ) is not deterministic. If F is not increasing, we loose
uniqueness of x and y. None of the results or intuitions hinge on these assumptions.
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with
τ(x) =
∫ a
x
f(s)(a− s)ds
=
∫ y
x
f(s)(a− s)ds+
∫ a
y
f(s)(a− s)ds
= (F (y)− F (x))
(
a−
∫ y
x f(s)sds
F (y)− F (x)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∫ a
y
f(s)(a− s)ds
= τ(y).
Thus, for any τ with 0 < τ ≤ τ(x) there are exactly two types θLτ , θHτ with τ =
τ(θLτ ) = τ(θ
H
τ ), where without loss of generality θ
L
τ < a < θ
H
τ . Let us call θ
L(τ) the
inverse function of τ(θ) on [x, a], and θH(τ) the inverse function of τ(θ) on [a, y].
This means that the distribution of τ is given by
G(τ) = F (θH(τ))− F (θL(τ)).
It follows18 that for any τ ∈ (0, τ(x)]
18We denote by P(A|τ) the regular conditional probability for A given τ . This notion extends
the concept of conditional probabilities to the case where one conditions on events of probability
zero. The regular conditional probability is defined by the condition that for any measurable sets
A,B the equality P(θ ∈ A, τ ∈ B) = ∫
B
P(A|τ)dG(τ) holds. It is unique almost surely. Since we
are interested in expectations only, this restriction is innocuous. For formal details see for example
§7 on regular conditional distributions in Shiryaev (1996).
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P(θHτ |τ) = P(θ > a|τ)
= lim
ε→0
P(θ > a|τ(θ) ∈ [τ, τ + ε])
= lim
ε→0
F (θH(τ + ε))− F (θH(τ))
F (θH(τ + ε))− F (θH(τ)) + F (θL(τ))− F (θL(τ + ε))
=
f(θHτ )θ
H ′(τ)
f(θHτ )θ
H ′(τ)− f(θLτ )θL′(τ)
=
f(θHτ )/τ
′(θHτ )
f(θHτ )/τ
′(θHτ )− f(θLτ )/τ ′(θLτ )
=
1/(θHτ − a)
1/(θHτ − a) + 1/(a− θLτ )
=
a− θLτ
θHτ − θLτ
.
Similarly, we have
P(θLτ |τ) =
θHτ − a
θHτ − θLτ
.
It follows that
E[θ|τ ] = θ
H
τ − a
θHτ − θLτ
θLτ +
a− θLτ
θHτ − θLτ
θHτ = a. (1.5)
This means that for any τ1, τ2 ∈ [0, τ(x)] with τ1 < τ2, the distribution F (·|τ2)
is a mean-preserving spread of F (·|τ1).19
The menu
We turn to the seller’s decision problem to choose an optimal menu of option
contracts, given τ . Consider the menuM = {(a, 0)}. All buyers with θ < x receive
a fully informative signal τ < 0, and know with certainty that their valuation
satisfies θ < a, so they would reject the contract. Types 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ(x) satisfy
E[θ|τ ] = a, and types τ > τ(x) satisfy E[θ|τ ] = τ > a, so they would both accept
the contract (a, 0), which sells ex ante at a uniform price of a. This means that
under contract M we have
uS = a(1− F (x)) = SS,
19Note however, that the common assumption in Courty and Li (2000) of
”
non-shifting sup-
port“is violated. Thus, we cannot use their standard procedure to solve the seller’s maximization
problem.
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and
uB =
∫ θ
x
θdF (θ)− uS = (BS + SS)− SS = BS.
This shows that the menu M indeed implements the buyer and seller utility we
want to construct. It remains to show, that M is an optimal menu for the seller
for the given signal τ .
The optimality of the menu
Let M˜ = {(ai, pi)}i∈I be an arbitrary menu of option contracts. We need to show
that it does not generate higher seller utility than SS.
Let θˆ be the lowest type who purchases the good under M˜, in the sense that he
chooses some (a, p) ∈ M˜ to pay the upfront fee a, and decides to buy the good at
the price p, after he learns his type.
Case 1: θˆ < x or θˆ > y
In this case θˆ learns his type with certainty under τ . Since, by assumption, he
accepts the contract (a, p), we can conclude that
a+ p ≤ θˆ.
Further, any buyer’s signal τ(θ) reveals to the buyer with certainty whether his
type satisfies θ > θˆ. This means, that any buyer with θ > θˆ learns from his signal
realization that he receives positive utility from contract (a, p). Consequently no
type θ > θˆ will accept a contract at higher total cost than a + p. Since θˆ is by
assumption the lowest type that buys, we can conclude that
uS ≤ (a+ p)(1− F (θˆ)) ≤ θˆ(1− F (θˆ) ≤ max
p
{(1− F (p))p} = piM ≤ SS.
Case 2: θˆ ∈ [x, a]
Then θˆ is the low type for the respective signal realization, ie. θˆ = θL
τ(θˆ)
< θH
τ(θˆ)
.
Thus, since type θL
τ(θˆ)
purchases the good under (a, p), so will type θH
τ(θˆ)
. By buyer’s
ex ante individual rationality we have
a+ p ≤ E[θ|τ(θˆ)] = a.
The contract (a, p) is therefore in particular also profitable to all types θ > y, who
learn their valuation ex ante with certainty. Hence, any of these types will as well
pay at most a + p ≤ a. Thus, even if the seller extracts all surplus from types
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θ ∈ [θˆ, y], her surplus is bounded by
uS ≤
∫ y
θˆ
θdF (θ) + (1− F (y))a
≤
∫ y
x
θdF (θ) + (1− F (y))a
= (F (y)− F (x))a+ (1− F (y))a
= (1− F (x))a
= SS
Case 3: θˆ ∈ [a, y]
Then θˆ is the high type for the respective signal realization, ie. θˆ = θH
τ(θˆ)
. Moreover,
we have θH
τ(θˆ)
≥ p > θL
τ(θˆ)
, because otherwise θL
τ(θˆ)
would purchase the good for p
whenever θH
τ(θˆ)
does, violating that θH
τ(θˆ)
is the lowest type who purchases the good.
Lemma 1.1 shows that since the ex-ante participation constraint is satisfied for
τ(θˆ), it can’t bind for any higher τ ∈ [τ(θˆ), τ(y)].
Lemma 1.1. If for signal types 0 ≤ τ1 < τ2 ≤ τ(y) and some contract (a, p) with
p > θLτ1 we have
−a+ P(θHτ1 |τ1)(θHτ1 − p) ≥ 0, (IR τ1)
then we have
−a+ P(θHτ2 |τ2)(θHτ2 − p) > 0. (IR τ2)
proof of Lemma 1.1. Call α1 := P(θHτ1 |τ1) and α2 := P(θHτ2 |τ2).
We thus need to show that
α1(θ
H
τ1 − p) < α2(θHτ2 − p)
If α2 > α1 this is immediate, since θ
H
τ2 > θ
H
τ1 . Assume therefore in the following
that α2 ≤ α1.
Equation (1.5) can be rewritten as
(1− α1)θLτ1 + α1θHτ1 = a,
or respectively
(1− α2)θLτ2 + α2θHτ2 = a.
It follows that
α1(θ
H
τ1 − θLτ1) = a− θLτ1 = (a− θLτ2) + (θLτ2 − θLτ1) = α2(θHτ2 − θLτ2) + (θLτ2 − θLτ1).
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Now, since θLτ2 < θ
L
τ1 < p and α2 < 1, we have
α1(θ
H
τ1 − p) = α1(θHτ1 − θLτ1) + α1(θLτ1 − p)
= α2(θ
H
τ2 − θLτ2) + (θLτ2 − θLτ1) + α1(θLτ1 − p)
< α2(θ
H
τ2 − θLτ2) + α2(θLτ2 − θLτ1) + α2(θLτ1 − p)
= α2(θ
H
τ2 − p).
Further, any type θ > y, who learns his type with certainty under τ , obtains a
utility of
uB = −a+ (θ − p) > −a+ (θˆ − p) > −a+ P(θˆ|τ(θˆ))(θˆ − p) ≥ 0
from contract (a, p). The contract thus generates positive expected utility to all
τ > τ(θˆ), and positive utility to all types θ > θˆ. This means that the contract
(a, p) alone induces all types θ ≥ θˆ to purchase the good. Since, by assumption, θˆ
is the lowest type who purchases the good for menu M˜, any additional contract in
the menu does not increase trade efficiency. It could therefore only decrease seller
utility, since a buyer would only take it if it yielded higher rents to him than the
contract (a, p), and thus lower rents to the seller. Therefore, if M˜ is an optimal
menu, we can assume M˜ = {(a, p)}, and seller utility is given by
uS =(1−G(τ(θˆ)))a+ (1− F (θˆ))p = (1− F (θˆ) + F (θLτ(θˆ))− F (x))a+ (1− F (θˆ))p.
Since by ex ante IR we have a ≤ P(θˆ|τ(θˆ))(θˆ − p), it follows that
uS ≤
(
1− F (θˆ) + F (θL
τ(θˆ)
)− F (x))P(θˆ|τ(θˆ))(θˆ − p) + (1− F (θˆ))p.
Recall that 0 ≤ θL
τ(θˆ)
< p ≤ θˆ, since θˆ is the lowest type who buys. If
(
1− F (θˆ) + F (θL
τ(θˆ)
)− F (x))P(θˆ|τ(θˆ)) > 1− F (θˆ),
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then
uS ≤
(
1− F (θˆ) + F (θL
τ(θˆ)
)− F (x))P(θˆ|τ(θˆ))θˆ
≤ (1− F (x))P(θˆ|τ(θˆ))θˆ
≤ (1− F (x))(P(θH
τ(θˆ)
|τ(θˆ))θˆ + P(θL
τ(θˆ)
|τ(θˆ))θL
τ(θˆ)
)
= (1− F (x))a
= SS.
Alternatively, if
(
1− F (θˆ) + F (θL
τ(θˆ)
)− F (x))P(θˆ|τ(θˆ)) ≤ 1− F (θˆ),
then
uS ≤
(
1− F (θˆ) + F (θL
τ(θˆ)
)− F (x))P(θˆ|τ(θˆ))(θˆ − p) + (1− F (θˆ))p
= (1− F (θˆ))(θˆ − p) + (1− F (θˆ))p
= (1− F (θˆ))θˆ
≤ max
p
(1− F (p))p
= piM
≤ SS
This concludes the proof that there is no menu M˜ which yields the seller a surplus
above SS. Consequently M is a seller-optimal contract.

Chapter 2
English versus Vickrey
Auctions with Loss Averse
Bidders
This Chapter is based on von Wangenheim (2017b).
2.1 Introduction
Auctions are a universal tool to organize sales in markets. At the core of auction
theory stand the famous revenue equivalence results. In particular, Vickrey (1961)
notes the strategic equivalence between the dynamic English and the static Vickrey
auction: if values are independent and private, there is no effect of sequential
information and it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid (up to) one’s private
valuation in both formats.1 These powerful theoretical predictions, however, stand
in contrast to the experimental literature, which mostly finds lower revenues for the
English auction.2 I identify endogenous preferences in form of expectation-based
loss aversion as a possible explanation for this phenomenon.
In my model, bidders evaluate any auction outcome relative to their reference
point, formed by rational expectations. Consequently, neither in the second-price
(Vickrey), nor in the ascending-clock (English) auction it is optimal any more
to bid (up to) the own intrinsic valuation. In particular, loss aversion leads to
strong overbidding for high types in the Vickrey auction. Moreover, if agents
update their reference point with respect to new information, opponents’ behavior
influences bidders’ reference point, and thus their endogenous preferences. Hence,
1Myerson (1981) extends the results to show that all main auction formats give rise to the same
expected revenue.
2For a summary of the experimental literature, see Kagel (1995).
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even if valuations for the object are entirely private, sequential information affects
the bidding behavior. Consequently, the English and the Vickrey auction are no
longer strategically equivalent. I demonstrate that—consistent with most of the
experimental evidence—the English auction yields lower revenue. I establish that
this effect is driven by a time-inconsistency problem, which dynamic expectation-
based loss averse bidders face when forming their bidding strategy.
Following the concept of loss aversion by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), I assume
bidders experience—in addition to classical utility —gain-loss utility from com-
paring the outcome to their expectations. Further, I assume that bidders assign
gains and losses separately to money and good (narrow bracketers). For the ease of
exposition, I consider mostly bidders who are only loss averse with respect to the
object.3 If they win the auction, they experience a feeling of elation, increasingly
in the extent to which winning was unexpected. Similarly, they perceive a feeling
of loss if they lose, increasingly in their expectations to win. Taking that into
account, bidders will overbid their intrinsic valuation. Since losses with respect to
expectations weigh stronger than gains, high types—who expect to win—overbid
more aggressively than low types in the Vickrey auction.
To model the impact of dynamic information on the reference point in the
dynamic English auction, I take the continuous-time limit of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2009): every clock increment bidders observe whether opponents drop out from the
auction. This information permanently updates expectations about winning the
auction and about how much to pay. If the changes in beliefs immediately update
the bidders’ reference points, they instantaneously perceive gain-loss utility, which
means that they assign gains and losses to changes in the reference distribution.
I consider the two extreme cases as benchmarks: if the reference-point updating
is sufficiently lagged with respect to changes in beliefs, there is no updating during
the auction process and therefore no impact of sequential information. The English
auction remains equivalent to the Vickrey auction in that case.
If the new information immediately updates the reference point, however, bid-
ders’ utility depends on the observed signals about opponents’ bidding strategies
during the auction process, even though values are private.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin interpret the reference point as lagged beliefs. Recent ex-
perimental findings, however, suggest that the reference point adjusts quickly to
new information. Whether instantaneous reference-point updating is a realistic
approximation may depend on the exact auction environment, e.g. the speed at
which the price augments, which can differ immensely across different English auc-
3I show in section 2.6.1 that the main insights generalize to the case where bidders assign gains
and losses separately to the money and good dimension.
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tions. Altogether, instantaneous updating constitutes a natural and important
benchmark.
Since losses weigh stronger than gains, expected reference dependent utility is
always negative. In particular, bidders dislike fluctuation in beliefs. As bidders
are forward looking, they will account for these costs when they form their bidding
strategy. In principle, an aggressive bid would to some extent insure against belief
fluctuations during the auction process. However, as the auction prevails, bidders’
beliefs to win the auction eventually decline. They become less attached to the
auctioned object, and at the point they would have to bid aggressively, it is time
inconsistent to do so. They eventually perceive themselves as a low type with
respect to the active bidders in the remaining auction. This leads to only moderate
overbidding - similarly as for low types in the Vickrey auction. Therefore, bidding
is less aggressive in the English auction with updated reference points.
Since bidders dislike belief fluctuations, they would prefer to refrain from ob-
serving the auction process and rather use proxies to bid on their behalf. The
logic is related to Benartzi et al. (1995) and Pagel (2016), who explain the equity
premium puzzle by loss aversion: since stock prices fluctuate, an investor who reg-
ularly checks her portfolio will experience negative reference-dependent utility in
expectation. This disutility makes stocks relatively less attractive to bonds.
Lange and Ratan (2010) highlight that in the presence of loss aversion in hedonic
dimensions most laboratory results may not be transferable to the field: the effects
of loss aversion are mainly driven by the assumption that bidders account losses
and gains separately in the money and the good dimension (narrow bracketing). In
order to control for private values, most auction experiments, however, use auction
tokens, which can be interchanged for money at the end of the experiment. In
context of these induced value experiments, bidders might not evaluate gains and
losses to tokens and money separately, as they are in fact both money.4 Since I
assume narrow bracketing throughout this chapter, my results are more likely to
apply to real commodity auctions, rather than to experiments on induced value
auctions. It can therefore explain the revenue gap between the Vickrey auction
and the English auction in the induced-value experimental literature, only if we
assume that bidders don’t perceive the tokens as money.
There is surprisingly little experimental literature that compares revenues of
the English auction and the Vickrey auction for real commodities.5 The only
4Indeed, Shogren et al. (1994) run Vickrey auctions to sell different goods and show that an
endowment effect is strongest for non-market goods with imperfect substitutes.
5The only field experiment I am aware of is conducted by Lucking-Reiley (1999), who trades
magic cards on an internet auction platform. He finds no significant difference in revenues, though
he admits himself that he cannot entirely control for a potential selection bias and endogenous
entry.
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laboratory controlled experiment that I am aware of, is conducted by Schindler
(2003). She reports 14 percent lower revenues in the English auctions, therefore
confirming the findings of the induced-value literature, as well as my theoretical
predictions.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses
the related literature, Section 2.3 analyzes the Vickrey auction with loss averse
bidders, while Section 2.4 analyzes the English auction with loss averse bidders. In
Section 2.5, I discuss the revenue comparison of both auction formats. Section 2.6
discusses several extensions, while Section 2.7 concludes this chapter. All proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
Kahneman et al. (1990) establish the endowment effect that agents’ valuation for
goods increase with ownership. It has since been experimentally replicated under
many different circumstances, for summaries see Camerer (1995) and Horowitz
and McConnell (2002). Tversky and Kahneman (1991) propose loss aversion with
respect to the status quo to explain the endowment effect.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) suggest recent rational expectations as reference
point. The hypothesis that expectations play a role in individual’s preferences
have been supported in recent experiments (Ericson and Fuster (2011) and Abeler
et al. (2011)), as well as challenged (Heffetz and List (2014)).6
The idea that the reference point is determined by recent beliefs leads to the nat-
ural question of the speed of reference-point adjustment. Strahilevitz and Loewen-
stein (1998) provide early evidence that the time span for which individuals hold
beliefs has an impact on the reference point. Gill and Prowse (2012) use a real ef-
fort task to measure loss aversion and find that in their framework “the adjustment
process is essentially instantaneous”. Smith (2012) induces different probabilities
of winning an item across groups of individuals. After the uncertainty resolves, he
measures the willingness to pay for the item among bidders who have not won. In
contrast to Ericson and Fuster (2011), who elicit valuations before the uncertainty
resolves, Smith finds no significant difference between different groups, which sug-
gests that the reference point is not so much determined by lagged beliefs, but
rather adjusts quickly to the new information.7
For static environments Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) has arguably become the
standard model of reference-dependent preferences, and been successfully applied to
6For a literature revue on related evidence, see Ericson and Fuster (2014).
7Smith’s confidence intervals are, however, rather wide.
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various fields, like mechanism design (Eisenhuth (2012)), contract theory (Herweg
et al. (2010)), industrial organization (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008)), and labor
markets (Eliaz and Spiegler (2014)). Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2014) show that buyers
in monopolistic markets may face a similar form of time inconsistency as I establish
for bidders in the English auction: ex ante they would like to commit not to buy.
If the seller induces low prices with some probability, this plan, however, is time
inconsistent. As a result, the consumer ends up buying for a high prices as well.
Dato et al. (2017) extend the equilibrium concepts of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) to
strategic interaction in static games.
In the context of auctions with reference-dependent preferences, Lange and
Ratan (2010) point out that loss-averse bidders may behave differently in laboratory
experiments than in the field; bidders may not bracket narrowly in induced-value
experiments. Further, they calculate the equilibrium bidding function of loss averse
bidders in the first-price auction and Vickrey auction for a different equilibrium
concept than I use in this chapter. (For a more detailed discussion of the equilibrium
concepts see section 3.)
Ehrhart and Ott (2014) introduce a model of the Dutch and English auc-
tion, where sequential information updates the reference point, but—in contrast to
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009)—does not induce gain-loss utility. As a result, in equi-
librium there is never any feeling of loss in the English auction, since by the time a
bidder drops out she expects to lose. Eisenhuth and Ewers (2010) show that the all-
pay auction yields higher payoffs than the first-price auction for narrow-bracketing
bidders, since loss-averse bidders dislike payment uncertainty.
For dynamic environments Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) propose a model of dy-
namic loss aversion, where updates of expectations carry reference-dependent util-
ity. This model has so far only been applied sparsely. First applications neverthe-
less seem promising. Rosato (2014) uses a two-period dynamic model to show that
revenues are decreasing in sequential auctions with loss-averse bidders, due to a
discouragement effect. To my best knowledge, Pagel is the first to rigorously apply
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) to dynamic problems with a long time horizon. Pagel
(2016) shows that dynamic reference-dependent preferences can explain the histor-
ical levels of equity premiums and premium volatility in asset prices. Related to
the logic in the English auction, loss-averse agents dislike price fluctuations, which
makes assets relatively unattractive. Pagel (2017) shows that dynamic reference-
dependent preferences can explain empirical observations about saving schemes for
life-cycle consumption.
To my best knowledge, my model is the first to analyze strategic interaction of
loss-averse players in a dynamic game with more than two periods.
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2.3 The Vickrey Auction
2.3.1 Auction Rules
The second-price auction or Vickrey auction is a static, sealed-bid auction format.
We assume that there are N loss averse bidders participating in the auction for a
non-divisible good. Bidder i’s valuation θi is privately observed and independently
drawn from a common distribution
θi ∼ G,
where G has a differentiable density g which is strictly positive on its support
[θmin, θmax], with 0 ≤ θmin < θmax. After learning their private valuation, every
participant submits a sealed bid. The bidder with the highest bid is assigned the
object and has to pay the amount of the second highest bid.
2.3.2 Preferences
I assume that bidders are loss averse in the sense of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). In
addition to classical utility from an endowment x ∈ R, bidders perceive a feeling
of gain or loss, depending on whether the endowment is higher or lower than their
reference point r ∈ R. If we assume that classical utility is linear in x, this means:
u(x|r) = x+ µ(x− r),
where µ characterizes the gain-loss utility. In the Vickrey auction there are two
commodity dimensions—money and good. We assume that bidders are narrow
bracketers: utility is additively separable and gains and losses are evaluated sepa-
rately across the two different dimensions: for any endowment level x = (xm, xg)
and any reference level r = (rm, rg), agents utility is given by
u(x|r) =
∑
k∈{m,g}
xk + µk(x
k − rk),
where we allow for different loss specifications across dimensions.
If the bidder is loss averse she will weigh losses with respect to her reference
point stronger than gains. Following Section IV in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and
most of the literature, I assume µk to be a piecewise linear function with a kink at
zero:
µk(y) =
ηky, y ≥ 0,λkηky, y < 0,
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where ηk > 0, λk > 1, and Λk := λkηk − ηk < 1 for k ∈ {m, g}.8 Because it suffices
for demonstrating the novel economic effect and allows for a significantly simpler
exposition, I first focus on the case in which bidders are loss averse in the good
dimension only, i.e. ηm = 0. In the extensions, I show that my results generalize
to the case where we allow for loss aversion in the money dimension as well.9
The key feature in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) is that the reference point is
stochastic and endogenously determined by rational beliefs over future endowment
levels. Consider an agent, who faces an uncertain payoff of x in some commodity
dimension, which is distributed according to some distribution F . Let the reference
point be determined by the agent’s beliefs F ′ about the outcome. A realization x
of x then yields an ex post utility in this commodity dimension of
u(x|F ′) = x+
∫
µ(x− r)dF ′(r).
Then the ex-ante expected utility of the endowment x is given by
U(F |F ′) := Eu(x, |F ′) =
∫ (
x+
∫
µ(x− r)dF ′(r))
)
dF (x).
If the agent has rational expectations, we have F = F ′, and the expected utility of
the lottery is
U(F |F ) := Eu(x, |F ) =
∫ (
x+
∫
µ(x− r)dF (r))
)
dF (x).
2.3.3 Equilibrium Concept
I adapt Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s equilibrium concept under uncertainty to allow for
interactive decision problems. I take an interim approach in the sense that each
bidder i forms her strategy after she learns her private valuation θi. Fixing all
opponents’ behavior, we summarize their strategy in the distribution H of the
maximal opponent bid. Given θi and H, any bid b induces some distribution
of auction outcomes and therefore payoff distribution F k = F k(b, θi, H) in the
respective commodity dimensions k ∈ {m, g}.
Definition 2.1. A bid b∗ ∈ R+ constitutes an unacclimated personal equilibrium
8The condition Λ < 1 is referred to as ”no dominance of gain-loss utility” by Herweg et al. (2010)
It ensures that the dislike for uncertainty isn’t too strong. If Λ > 1 a bidder could potentially
prefer a strictly dominated safe outcome to a lottery.
9Horowitz and McConnell (2002) conclude in their summary that the endowment effect is
”highest for non-market goods, next highest for ordinary private goods, and lowest for experiments
involving forms of money.” In this sense it may be plausible that loss aversion mainly applies to
the good dimension.
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(UPE) in the Vickrey auction for bidder i if for all b ∈ R+,∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k(b∗, θi, H)|F k(b∗, θi, H)) ≥
∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k(b, θi, H)|F k(b∗, θi, H)).
In other words b∗ is a UPE if, given the reference point generated by the ac-
tion b∗, there is no profitable deviation b. It contrasts the definition of a choice-
acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE), where we require∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k(b∗, θi, H)|F k(b∗, θi, H)) ≥
∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k(b, θi, H)|F k(b, θi, H))
for all b ∈ R+. Thus, in contrast to the UPE-bidder, a CPE-bidder—which is ana-
lyzed in Lange and Ratan (2010)—already internalizes the effects of her deviation
on the reference point. I believe the UPE is the appropriate equilibrium concept
in the Vickrey auction, mainly for two reasons.
Firstly, I apply the model as proposed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin who suggest that
the UPE is more appropriate if the bidder “anticipates the decision she faces but
cannot commit to a choice until shortly before the outcome” (Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2007)). In auction settings bidders may know her valuation and form expectations
long before the auction starts. Bids are, however, typically placed only shortly
before the auction uncertainty resolves, and may depend on characteristics specific
to the environment, such as the number of bidders actually participating in the
auction.
Secondly, the UPE is the static analog of the concept of a personal equilibrium,
which will be introduced in Section 4 to analyze the dynamic English auction. In
this context one can gather another (dynamic) interpretation for the UPE: the
decision maker ex ante forms a plan before the auction actually starts. This plan
will determine her reference-point. The plan is a UPE if it is time-consistent in the
sense that the decision maker is willing to carry it through at the time of action.
In a joint equilibrium, the first order statistic of the n − 1 opponent bids H
is endogenously determined by the equilibrium bidding strategy. Thus, if b(θ)
constitutes a symmetric increasing equilibrium bidding function, we necessarily
have
H(b(θ)) = Gn−1(θ).
Definition 2.2. In the Vickrey auction with n loss averse bidders, an increasing
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function b(θ) constitutes a symmetric UPE if for all θ and all b′∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k(b(θ), θ, Gn−1(b−1(·)))|F k(b(θ), θ,Gn−1(b−1(·))))
≥
∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k(b′, θ, Gn−1(b−1(·)))|F k(b(θ), θ, Gn−1(b−1(·)))).
2.3.4 The Equilibrium
In this section we restrict attention to agents who are loss averse only in the good
dimension. A more elaborate analysis of the general case, which allows for loss
aversion in the money dimension is relegated to the extensions. Consider a bidder
of type θ who plans to submit a bid of b∗. Given the distribution H of the highest
opponent bid, the plan induces the reference distribution to win a utility of θ with
probability of H(b∗). Suppressing some notation, the utility of bidding b if planning
to bid b∗ is given by
u(b, θ|b∗) :=
∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k(b, θ,H)|F k(b∗, θ,H))
= H(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob to win
(
θ + (1−H(b∗))µ(θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
feeling of gain
+ (1−H(b))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob to lose
H(b∗)µ(−θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
feeling of loss
+
∫ b
0
−sH(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
money dimension
=
∫ b
0
(θ − s)dH(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
classical utility
+H(b)(1−H(b∗))µ(θ) + (1−H(b))H(b∗)µ(−θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total reference-dependent utility
.
In any symmetric equilibrium, b = b∗ must be the utility maximizing bid, where H
is given by opponents’ symmetric bidding behavior.
Theorem 2.1. The unique symmetric increasing continuously differentiable UPE
in the Vickrey auction with n bidders who are loss averse with respect to the good
is given by
b(θ) =
(
1 + η(1−Gn−1(θ)) + ληGn−1(θ))θ.
Note that all types overbid with respect to their intrinsic valuation θ. This
should not be too surprising since we have assigned loss aversion only to the good
dimension, and therefore made the good relatively more important, compared to
money. More interestingly, the degree of overbidding is increasing in the type. The
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lowest type moderately overbids by
b(θmin) = (1 + η)θmin,
while the highest type aggressively overbids by
b(θmax) = (1 + λη)θmax.
The reason is the so called attachment effect: high types believe to win. Not
winning would create a feeling of loss, which they try to prevent by placing an
aggressive bid. As we will see section 2.6.1, this intuition remains intact, if we
allow for loss aversion in money as well.
2.4 The English Auction
2.4.1 The Model
The Auction Format
The English auction format I am considering is sometimes referred to as the “As-
cending Clock Auction” or the “Japanese Auction”. In contrast to the “Open
Outcry Auction” bidding starts at a fixed price and is raised incrementally by the
auctioneer each time period. Each bidder signals—for example by raising or drop-
ping her hand—when she wishes to drop out of the auction. Once a bidder dropped
out she cannot bid again. The auction ends if there is only one active bidder left.
This bidder has to pay the price, at which the last of her opponents dropped out.
For simplicity, we assume that there is no reservation price—the clock starts
with a price of zero. The effect of a reserve price is analyzed in extension 2.6.3.
Preferences
We assume that bidders’ intrinsic valuations θi for the object are privately observed
and independently drawn
θi ∼ G
from a distribution G that has a differentiable and strictly positive density g on a
positive support [θmin, θmax]. The distribution G is common knowledge. Bidders
are assumed to be loss averse.
I follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) in how to model loss aversion in a dynamic
discrete-time environment: agents hold rational beliefs about winning the auction
and the respective transfers made after the auction is over. Every period, the agent
observes, whether any opponents drop out at the current price and thus receives
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an information signal about the outcome. We denote by F kt , the beliefs over final
transfers in k ∈ {money, good}, as anticipated at time t. As the signal at any
time t changes beliefs over the auction outcome, this instantaneously gives rise to
psychological gain-loss utility, denoted by N(F kt |F kt−1), separately to changes in
money and good.
For the evaluation of gain-loss utility, agents are assumed to assign gains and
losses to changes in the respective quantiles of the distribution function. The
intuition is that the agents rank possible outcomes from worst to best and then
evaluate changes to the worst, the second worst ,..., until the best outcome. Let
us denote with cFkt
the quantile function of F kt , which is mathematically just the
inverse of F kt . Then
N(F kt |F kt−1) =
∫ 1
0
µk(cFkt
(p)− cFkt−1(p))dp,
where again
µ(x) =
ηk · x, x ≥ 0,ηk · λk · x, x < 0,
ηk > 0, λk > 1, and Λk := λkηk − ηk < 1.
In other words, during the auction process bidders accumulate information about
the auction outcome. They absorb this information in their reference-point, which
instantaneously exposes them to (possibly mixed) feelings of gains and losses. The
total utility perceived in the auction process is given by the accumulated gain-loss
utility and the classical utility from trade if the auction is won. In the following
analysis, it is convenient to index the distributions with the current price rather
than with the time period. After learning her type θi, bidder i forms a bidding
strategy, which induces beliefs Fm0 and F
g
0 about the auction outcome. If the
auction runs for at most T increments of ε, we can write the total utility of the
auction as
ui =
T∑
t=1
(
N(Fmtε |Fm(t−1)ε) +N(F gtε|F g(t−1)ε)
)
+ (θi − x)
if bidder i wins the auction at a price of x, and as
ui =
T∑
t=1
(
N(Fmtε |Fm(t−1)ε) +N(F gtε|F g(t−1)ε)
)
if bidder i loses the auction. Note that the upper bound of T in the sum is without
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loss of generality; if the auction terminates early, all subsequent periods can be
regarded as uninformative, and carry no further reference-dependent utility.
Equilibrium Concepts
I concisely sketch the equilibrium concept of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). For full
details and a psychological justification of the specific dynamic modeling choices,
I refer to their paper.
Definition 2.3. An action plan specifies an action for every realization of infor-
mation at every point in time. An action plan constitutes a personal equilibrium
(PE) if, given the reference point resulting from the plan, it maximizes expected
utility at any point in time among all plans that the agent is willing to carry
through.
This means in particular:
• The bidder can only make credible plans in the sense that she cannot commit
to plans that her future self does not want to carry through at the time of
actions. Committing to unfavorable actions could be profitable, because it
would manipulate beliefs, and therefore the own reference point.
• In suppressed notation, an action plan that induces a distribution F is an
equilibrium if and only if at any point in time u(Ft|Ft) ≥ u(F ′t |Ft) for any
distribution F ′t that would result from another credible plan.
• Given the opponents’ behavior, an agent determines her set of personal equi-
libria by backward reasoning: she evaluates any action in T − 1 with respect
to her optimal actions in period T , and proceeds backwards.
The only constraint on initial beliefs is that they are rational, given the action
plan. In general, there may be multiple personal equilibria.
Definition 2.4. A personal equilibrium is a preferred personal equilibrium if
it is the utility maximizing PE at time zero.
The set of personal equilibria depends on the belief about other players’ ac-
tions. To analyze the interaction between multiple bidders, we focus on symmetric
personal equilibria.
Definition 2.5. A strategy b(θ) assigns to each possible type θ an action plan.
A strategy constitutes a (preferred) symmetric equilibrium in the English
auction if for each type θ and the belief that all opponents bid according to strategy
b the action plan b(θ) constitutes a (preferred) personal equilibrium.
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Timing
First bidders privately learn their valuation θi for the object. Then each bidder
forms an action plan, which prescribes for any time (clock price) and any opponent
drop-out history, the decision whether to drop out or to remain. Rational beliefs
induced by this action plan form the bidder’s reference point. Finally, the auction
takes place. Any period during the auction process is characterized by the following
timing:
• The price on the clock ascends and bidders simultaneously signal whether
they stay in or drop out. If a bidder deviates from her action plan, she
updates her reference point according to new rational beliefs. The update
instantaneously induces reference-dependent utility
• Bidders observe, whether opponents drop out and update their reference point
about payoffs. The update instantaneously gives rise to gain-loss utility.
• If there is at most one bidder remaining active, the auction is terminated. The
remaining bidder is assigned the object and pays the current clock price.10
2.4.2 Analysis
Illustrative Example of Updating
This example aims to provide an illustration how gain-loss utility is formed during
the auction process, and to show why bidders would always prefer a proxy to bid
on their behalf in the English auction—taken behavior of opponents as given.
Consider an English auction with two bidders. Let bidder 1—in the following
referred to as the bidder—have a valuation of θ for the object. Assume that the
bidder plans to drop out at a price of 8 and knows that the drop-out price of
bidder 2 — in the following called opponent—is ex ante uniformly distributed on
[0, 10] (we do not consider here, under which circumstances this behavior would
be optimal). Ex ante, the bidder has a probability of 0.8 to win the auction and
to have a payoff of θ in the good dimension. In the money dimension she faces a
probability of 0.2 to pay nothing. Prices between 0 and 8 are uniformly distributed
and have a mass of 0.8 all together (if we assume arbitrary small increments on
the clock for mathematical convenience). Thus, the ex ante quantile functions are
given by
10For mathematical convenience, I abstract from tie breaking rules and assume that the good
is not sold, if the remaining bidders drop out simultaneously. With our assumption of continuous
density of types, as we let the increment size go to zero, this becomes equivalent to a tie breaking
rule by coin-flip.
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cF g0 (p) =
0, p ≤ 0.2,θ, p > 0.2
in the good dimension, and
cFm0 (p) =
−8 + 10p, p ≤ 0.8,0, p > 0.8,
in the money dimension.
Assume the opponent drops out at a price of 6. While the clock price ascends,
the bidder permanently updates her beliefs. Let us look at the good dimension:
for any increment below the price of 6, the bidder realizes that the opponent didn’t
drop out at that price, which reduces her beliefs to win the auction by some small
amount. This means that during the auction process she accumulates perceived
losses in the good dimension. Figure 2.1 shows the quantile functions at different
clock prices.
At a clock price of 0—that is before the auction starts—the bidder holds her
prior belief to win the auction with a probability of 0.8. The respective quantile
function is a step function which is zero with probability 0.2, and θ with probability
0.8 (dotted line). At a price of 4 the bidder knows that the opponent hasn’t dropped
out between 0 and 4. Therefore bidder’s updated belief to win is given by the
probability that the opponent will drop out at price between 4 and 8, conditional
on the fact that he will drop out between 4 and 10. It has thus decreased to two
third which is indicated by the dashed quantile function. The medium grey shaded
area is proportional to the loss the bidder has accumulated up to the price of 4 as
the difference of the initial and current quantile function. Just before the opponent
drops out at 6, bidder’s belief has further decreased to almost one half—she wins if
opponent drops out between 6 and 8, but loses if the opponent drops out between
8 and 10 (solid quantile function with jump at 0.5). The light shaded area shows
the additional loss just before a price of 6 is announced. The losses have to be
weighted with a factor of λη. The moment the price increases to 6, the opponent
drops out and the bidder wins with certainty. The quantile function jumps to the
constant function cF g6 = θ, inducing a feeling of gain of η times the three combined
shaded areas.
Thus, the net gain-loss utility in the good dimension is (0.2η+ 0.3(η− λη))θ =
(0.2η−0.3Λ)θ. Since losses weight stronger than gains, the relief of winning the light
gray and medium gray area after all can only partly make up for the disappointment
felt during the auction process. If the bidder could use a bidding proxy that enabled
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Figure 2.1: Updating in the English Auction
her to ignore new information until the auction was over, she would forgo the
unpleasant variation in beliefs, which causes disutility of −0.3Λθ. This logic is
due to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), who find that, ceteris paribus, any collapse of
information signals weakly increases agents’ utility. Note that the use of a proxy
in our two-bidder example is equivalent to submitting a sealed maximum bid. The
example thus illustrates that——fixing her strategy and other bidders behavior—a
loss averse bidder obtains weakly higher utility in the Vickrey auction than in the
English auction.
The updating with respect to money is a bit more complex than the updating in
the good dimension: if an opponent does not drop out at some price, the probability
of losing and paying nothing increases as well as the probability of paying a high
price. Nevertheless the same intuition applies: fluctuations in beliefs are costly,
and loss-averse bidder would prefer to get all information at once. To summarize:
Corollary 2.1. Loss-averse agents would prefer the use of proxies to bid on their
behalf in the English auction. Thus, for a given set of bidders’ maximal bids, any
loss-averse bidder receives weakly higher utility in a Vickrey auction than in an
English auction.
Equilibrium Behavior for 2 Bidders
In the following, I analyze the set of equilibria in the English auction with two bid-
ders, who are loss averse in the good dimension, as the increment size goes to zero.
In section 2.6.4, I show that the main insights generalize to the n bidder auction.
While the history-dependend strategy space in an n-bidder English auction is huge,
it is fairly simple in a two-bidder game. Given type θ, an action plan prescribes
the price at which the bidder plans to drop out, provided that the opponent is still
active.
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Each period the bidder observes whether her opponent remains in the auction.
This information permanently updates her reference point, which induces gain-
loss utility in each increment. An optimal bidding strategy will take the expected
gain-loss utility from news into account.
For calculating the ex-ante expected gain-loss utility, it is more convenient
to work with distribution functions rather than with quantile functions. This is
possible, since they are inverse functions of each other, and the integral between
functions equals the integral between their inverses up to the sign:
Lemma 2.1. Let F1 and F2 be continuous distributions on an interval [a, b] and
let cF1, cF2 be the respective quantile functions. Then∫ b
a
(F1(x)− F2(x))dx =
∫ 1
0
(cF2(p)− cF1(p))dp.
With this result, one can look at the expected disutility from news.
Proposition 2.1. Assume that a loss-averse bidder’s payoff is distributed according
to some distribution F1 with a probability of ∆, and according to distribution F2
with a probability of 1 − ∆. Let [a, b] be the common support of F1 and F2. We
denote with F = ∆F1 + (1 − ∆)F2 the ex ante distribution of the payoff. Then
the ex ante expected reference-dependent utility from learning, whether the true
distribution is F1 or F2, is given by
E(N(Fi|F ) = −∆Λ
∫ 1
0
|cF1(p)− cF (p)|dp,
or equivalently by
E(N(Fi|F ) = −∆Λ
∫ b
a
|F (x)− F1(x)|dx.
The intuition for the result is as follows: on average, there is “as much good
news as bad news”. If gains and losses weighted equally, one would have zero gain-
loss utility in average. Since losses loom larger than gains, variation will give us
negative utility in expectation where the amount of negative utility is proportional
to the expected variation and the loss dominance parameter Λ.
With this result we can calculate the accumulated expected loss due to gain-loss
utility, as the increment size goes to zero. Let us denote with F the distribution of
the opponent’s drop-out price, in the sense that an opponent with drop-out price
y remains in the auction at any clock price t < y, and drops out at prices t ≥ y.
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Proposition 2.2. Consider a loss-averse bidder of type θ in the English auction
with increments of ε and one opponent. Let the opponent’s drop-out price be dis-
tributed according to distribution F with density f . Assume the bidder plans to
drop out at x, and the opponent hasn’t dropped out until time t < x. Then, for ε
going to zero, in the limit the ex ante expected marginal gain-loss utility at time t
is given by
`t(x, θ, F ) =
−f(t)
(1− F (t))2 (1− F (x))Λθ.
Expected gain-loss utility for the remaining auction at time t is in the limit given
by
Lt(x, θ, F ) = ln
(
1− F (x)
1− F (t)
)
1− F (x)
1− F (t) Λθ.
Since losses weight stronger than gains, expected gain-loss utility is always
negative. Note that the amount of marginal disutility is decreasing in x: an ag-
gressive strategy induces less belief fluctuation at each information update, and
thus partly insures against high gain-loss disutility in each increment. There is,
however, a countervailing effect on total gain-loss disutility: the higher bidder’s
drop-out price, the longer she may stay in the auction and be exposed to gain-loss
disutility. Figure 2.2 shows total expected gain-loss disutility at the beginning of
the auction for F ∼ U [0, 1]. We see that losses are the strongest for intermediate
bids who face the highest uncertainty. Bidding 0 or 1 induces no uncertainty, and
therefore no gain-loss utility.
In the following, we refer to the limit result as we let the increment size go to
zero as the continuous English auction.11
With Lt(x, θ, F ) we have established a function for the expected gain-loss utility
on the equilibrium path for the strategy x. We now calculate the instantaneous gain-
loss utility that the bidder perceives, if she decides to deviate from strategy x to
strategy y at some point in time:
Lemma 2.2. Consider a loss averse bidder in an English auction with one oppo-
nent. Let the opponent’s drop-out price be distributed according to F . If at time
t the bidder changes her strategy from dropping out at x ≥ t to dropping out at
y ≥ t, this deviation induces an instantaneous gain-loss utility of
N(F yt |F xt ) =
µ(F (y)− F (x))
1− F (t) θ.
Let us denote with ut(y, θ, F |x) for t ≤ x, y the remaining expected utility of
11This notion does not intend to refer to the concept of continuous games by Simon and Stinch-
combe (1989). One should still regard the game as one with discrete increments on the clock which
are, however, arbitrarily small.
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Figure 2.2: Total Expected Loss for F ∼ U [0, 1]
the agent at time t in the continuous English auction if she deviates at time t from
strategy x to strategy y. Then, summarizing Proposition 2.2 and Lemma 2.2 we
obtain
ut(y, θ, F |x) =
∫ y
t (θ − s)dF (s)
1− F (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
classical utility
+
µ(F (y)− F (x))
1− F (t) θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain/loss from one-time update
+ Lt(y, θ, F ).︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected gain-loss utility
of remaining auction
All three terms change if a bidder deviates to another strategy. Note that the
deviation utility is non-differentiable at y = x, since µ has a kink at zero.
With this notation and the above results, we can restate the condition for a
strategy to be an equilibrium as we let the increment size go to zero.
Corollary 2.2. In the continuous English auction a bidding strategy x is a personal
equilibrium if and only if
ut(y, θ, F |x) ≤ ut(x, θ, F |x)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ x, y and all strategies y that are credible at all times s > t.
Since the equilibrium concept restricts to strategies x that the agent wants to
carry through at any time, it is in particular necessary that the agent does not
want to drop out just before x is reached. This leads to the following constraint
on time consistent plans.
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Lemma 2.3. Consider a loss-averse bidder of type θ in the continuous English
auction with one opponent. Let the opponent’s drop-out price be distributed accord-
ing to distribution F with nonzero density f on some positive support [a, b]. Then,
any time consistent bidding strategy x ∈ (a, b) satisfies
x ≤ (1 + η)θ.
To understand the significance of this result, it is insightful to look at plans the
bidder would choose if she could commit to a bidding strategy before the auction
starts. She would not like to deviate from a strategy ex ante if and only if
u0(y, θ, F |x) ≤ u0(x, θ, F |x)
for all y.
Proposition 2.3. If two loss averse bidders could commit ex ante to a bidding
strategy in the continuous English auction, the lowest symmetric increasing differ-
entiable equilibrium would satisfy
b(θ) =
(
1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ.
Figure 2.3 shows the ex ante optimal strategy (solid function) and the boundary
of time-consistent strategies (dashed line) for two loss averse bidders.
Figure 2.3: Ex-ante strategy and time-cons. constraint, G(θ) ∼ U [0, 1], η = 0.3, λ =
4
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We see that low types ex ante may wish to underbid, while high types wish
to strongly overbid. The intuition here is the same as in the Vickrey auction:
bidders want to reduce expected gain-loss utility, and therefore try to reduce the
uncertainty about winning. In particular high types would wish to insure with an
aggressive bid against belief fluctuations during the auction process.
However, it is time-inconsistent to bid above x = (1 + η)θ. Even though a
bidder with a high valuation would ex ante like to commit to an aggressive bidding
strategy, at the time she has to do so, she is not any more willing to carry that action
through: as the auction proceeds, the winning chances for the bidder gradually
decline. Thus, she gradually becomes a low type with respect to the remaining
auction, and therefore her initial strategy of overbidding becomes less appealing.
Just one increment before the bidder’s drop out, she perceives the remaining auction
similarly as a Vickrey auction, where she has the lowest possible type. Hence, at
that point in time, her optimal bidding strategy resembles that of the lowest type
in the Vickrey auction, i.e. she bids no more than x = (1 + η)θ.
We have so far only considered constraints on equilibrium behavior at time 0
and at time x. It turns out that these are the binding constraints.
Lemma 2.4. Consider a loss-averse bidder of type θ in the continuous English
auction with one opponent. Let the opponent’s drop-out price be distributed accord-
ing to distribution F with nonzero density f on some positive support [a, b]. Then
a strategy x ∈ (a, b) is a PE if and only if
1. x ≤ (1 + η)θ;
2. for any y ∈ [x, (1 + η)θ] we have u0(x, θ, F |x) ≥ u0(y, θ, F |x).
Theorem 2.2. An increasing, almost everywhere differentiable function b(θ) is
a symmetric equilibrium in the continuous English auction with two loss averse
bidders if and only if for all θ
1. b(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ;
2. b(θ) ≥ min{(1 + η)θ ; (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ }.
Thus, any increasing smooth function in the the gray shaded area of Figure 2.4
constitutes a symmetric equilibrium.
The thick line indicates the preferred symmetric equilibrium (PPE). Point
A, where the PPE hits the boundary of time consistent strategies can be easily
determined:
(1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ = (1 + η)θ
if and only if G(θ) = 1− 1/e ≈ 0.632.
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Figure 2.4: Equilibria in the English auction, G(θ) ∼ U [0, 1], η = 0.3, λ = 4
Note that the PPE is tangent to (1 + η − Λ)θ at the lowest type. Hence there
is underbidding for low types if and only if η − Λ > 0, thus if and only if λ > 2.
Corollary 2.3. The symmetric PPE in the continuous English auction with two
loss averse bidders is given by
bPPE(θ) =
(1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ)))
)
θ, G(θ) ≤ 1− 1/e,
(1 + η)θ, G(θ) > 1− 1/e.
Low types underbid their intrinsic valuation θ in the PPE if and only if λ > 2.
2.5 Revenue Comparison
The equilibrium bidding function of an English auction with loss-averse bidders
strongly depends on the question how quickly new information is absorbed in the
reference point.
If the reference point consists of lagged beliefs, and the lag is sufficiently high,
new information during the auction process will have no impact on bidders reference
point. If values are private, there is therefore no impact of information gathered
during the auction process. Each bidder will form her optimal decision with respect
to the initial belief, and thus faces the same objective function as in the Vickrey
auction—the strategic equivalence between English and Vickrey auction remains.
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If bidders, however, update their reference point dynamically with respect to
new information, loss-averse bidders bid at most (1 + η)θ.
Figure 2.5 shows the equilibrium bidding function for the Vickrey auction,
bVickrey(θ), and the PPE of the English auction with dynamic reference point updat-
ing, bEnglish(θ). The shaded area indicates the potential other symmetric equilibria
in the English auction, which are bounded by the line (1 + η)θ.
Figure 2.5: Equilibrium bidding function, G(θ) ∼ U [0, 1], η = 0.3, λ = 4
As we have seen in section 3, overbidding with respect to θ is moderate for low
types and strong for high types in the Vickrey auction. We can see that bVickrey(θ)
at the lowest type is tangent to (1 + η)θ—the upper bound of equilibria in the
English auction. The intuition is that for low types the decision problem in both
auction formats becomes increasingly similar: since bidders in the English auction
only learn, whether there are opponents with lower valuation than their own, the
information difference between the two auction formats at the time the bidder
places her (maximal) bid is small for low types.
Since the bidding function in the Vickrey auction satisfies bVickrey(θ) > (1+η)θ
for all types θ > θmin, it is immediate that the Vickrey auction dominates the
English auction with respect to revenue.
Theorem 2.3. 1. If bidders are loss averse and do not update their reference
point during the auction process, the Vickrey auction and the English auction
are strategically equivalent: for a given continuous belief on the maximal op-
ponent bid, bidding b is a UPE in the Vickrey auction if and only if bidding
up to b is a PE in the English auction.
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2. If bidders are loss averse and update their reference point instantaneously
during the auction process, equilibrium bids of the lowest type may coincide
for both auction formats. For all other types, the Vickrey auction attains
strictly higher revenue than the English auction.
2.6 Extensions and Robustness
2.6.1 Loss Aversion in the Money Dimensions
We generalize the baseline model to the case where bidders are loss averse in both
commodity dimensions—money and good.
The Vickrey Auction
The utility of a bidder of type θ who places a bid of b but has a reference point as
if bidding b∗ is given by
u(b, θ|b∗) :=
∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k(b, θ,H)|F k(b∗, θ,H))
=
∫ b
0
(
−s+
∫ b∗
0
µm(t− s)dH(t) +
∫ ∞
b∗
µm(−s)dH(t)
)
dH(s)
+
∫ ∞
b
(∫ b∗
0
µm(t)dH(t) +
∫ ∞
b∗
µm(0)dH(t)
)
dH(s)
+
∫ b
0
(
θ +
∫ b∗
0
µg(0)dH(t) +
∫ ∞
b∗
µg(θ)dH(t)
)
dH(s)
+
∫ ∞
b
(∫ b∗
0
µg(−θ)dH(t) +
∫ ∞
b∗
µg(0)dH(t)
)
dH(s),
where H is again the distribution of the maximal opponent bid. The variable s
corresponds to the realization of H, the variable t to the reference point. The first
of the four summands corresponds to the utility in money if bidder i wins, the
second if she loses. Similarly the third summand corresponds to utility in the good
dimension if the auction is won, and summand four if the auction is lost.
In equilibrium the order statistic H is again endogenously determined by the
opponents’ equilibrium bids b(θ−i). Using the opponents’ response functions, it is
straightforward to calculate the symmetric equilibrium bidding function:
Theorem 2.4. The unique symmetric increasing continuously differentiable UPE
for n loss averse bidders in the Vickrey auction for commodities is given by
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b(θ) =
1 + ηg + ΛgG
n−1(θ)
1 + λmηm
θ
+
∫ θ
θmin
Λm(1 + ηg + ΛgG
n−1(x))
(1 + λmηm)2
x exp
(
Λm
1 + λmηm
(Gn−1(θ)−Gn−1(x))
)
dG(x).
Note that
b(θmin) =
1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θmin,
while for any θ > θmin
b(θ)) >
1 + ηg + ΛgG
n−1(θ)
1 + λmηm
θ >
1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θ.
In particular, for equally weighted loss aversion in both dimensions, low types
underbid, while
b(θmax) >
1 + η + ΛGn−1(θmax)
1 + λη
θmax
=
1 + η + Λ
1 + λη
θmax
= θmax
shows that high types overbid their intrinsic valuation. The intuition is that low
types don’t expect to win and try to avoid unexpected losses in the money dimen-
sion. In contrast, high types expect to win and try to avoid unexpected losses in
the good dimension.
The English Auction
We avoid to fully classify the set of symmetric PE again, but rather straightfor-
wardly prove that the revenue ranking between the two auction formats remains
intact.12 The following Lemma parallels Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.5. Consider a loss-averse bidder of type θ in the continuous English
auction with one opponent. Let the opponent’s drop-out price be distributed accord-
ing to distribution F with nonzero density f on some positive support [a, b]. Then,
12The full derivation of the symmetric equilibrium bidding functions is available on request.
58 2.6. EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS
any time consistent bidding strategy x ∈ (a, b) satisfies
x ≤ 1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θ.
Again, the bidders of high type ex ante like to commit excessive bids, but they
know that the plan to bid above the threshold of
1+ηg
1+λmηm
θ is time-inconsistent.
Just one increment before they drop out, their belief to win and pay is virtually
zero and—similarly to the lowest type in the Vickrey auction—they trade off the
unexpected gain of the good against the unexpected loss in money, which may
both occur with very small probability. If loss aversion is equally pronounced in
both dimensions, then bidders underbid their intrinsic value θ, since losses weight
stronger than gains.
Revenue Comparison
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium bidding functions, G(θ) ∼ U [0, 1], η = 0.4, λ = 3
Since in the Vickrey auction we have
bVickrey(θ) ≥ 1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θ,
with equality only for θmin, and in the English auction we have
bEnglish(θ) ≤ 1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θ,
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it is immediate that the Vickrey auction remains to dominate the English auction
with respect to revenue.
Figure 2.6 shows the gray shaded area of potential equilibria in the English
auctions, together with its PPE, and the equilibrium in the Vickrey auction. If
loss aversion is equally pronounced in both dimensions, there is unambiguously un-
derbidding in the English auction, while in the Vickrey auction low types underbid
and high types overbid.
2.6.2 False Beliefs or Heterogeneous Preferences
So far we have assumed that all participating bidders are loss averse and hold
rational beliefs over opponents’ behavior. This is not a crucial assumption. Loss-
averse bidders will bid higher in the Vickrey auction than in the English auction for
any continuous belief with full support that they hold over opponents strategies.
Following the analysis of section 2.3, equation 2.1 in the proof of Theorem 2.1
states that for any such belief H the bidding function in the Vickrey auction is
given by
b(θ) =
(
1 + η(1−H(b(θ))) + ληH(b(θ)))θ,
which shows that
b(θ) > (1 + η)θ
for all types, who win with positive probability. Contrary, in the English auction
Lemma 2.3 shows that for any such belief
b(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ.
2.6.3 Reserve Price
A reserve price is a prominent tool in auctions to guarantee some minimum price.
If agents are loss averse, a reserve price will also impact the bidding strategy of the
bidders above the reserve price.
Consider a Vickrey auction with n loss-averse bidders. Since the implementa-
tion of a reserve price excludes low types from participation, an ex ante announce-
ment of such would have a selection effect on bidders who participate. It would
considerably change beliefs about the participating opponents’ types. To abstract
away from this effect, assume that a reserve price x is announced after the bidders
committed to participate, and before bidders form their strategies. Bids below the
reserve price remain feasible, but cannot win.
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Proposition 2.4. Let b(θ) be the equilibrium bidding function of n loss-averse
bidders in the Vickrey auction without reserve price. If bidders are loss averse with
respect to money, a public reserve price x > b(θmin) increases the equilibrium bid
of all bidders with b(θ) ≥ x.
Thus, if the object is sold, a reserve price increases revenues, even if it is not
binding. To get the intuition for this result, note that the reserve price has no
direct effect on the winning probability for bidders with b(θ) > x in any symmetric
increasing equilibrium. A reserve price has therefore no impact on loss aversion in
the good dimension. However, the belief of paying less than x decreases. If bidders
are loss averse with respect to money, high prices now induce less loss in the money
dimension, with respect to expectations. This reduces expected gain-loss disutility
from a high bid.
The same holds for similar reasons in the English auction with loss aversion in
money, which we omit to prove here. In the English auction with loss aversion in the
good dimension only, a reserve price has again no effect on equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 2.5. Consider a continuous English auction with two bidders, who
are loss averse in the good dimension. A reserve price of x has no effect on an
equilibrium bidding function b for any type θ with b(θ) > x.
2.6.4 Generalization to n bidders
In auctions where bidders face more than one opponent, the set of possible action
plans becomes very large. Recall that an action plan prescribes a consistent action
for any history and any future contingency at any time. While in the two bidder
case the history is rather simple—either the opponent dropped out and the auction
is over, or we are still in the auction process—with more bidders the individual de-
cision at each time may in principle depend on the exact timing at which opponents
dropped out in the past.
Since each decision must be sequentially optimal, given expectations about the
future, one might hope to be able to restrict to Markov perfect equilibria, in the
sense that at time t the individual type θi and the number of currently active bidders
is a sufficient statistic for the optimal decision of bidder i. However, this is not
the case. While the set of personal equilibria starting at time t can be determined
without looking into the past, the specific equilibrium path will depend on the
evolution of beliefs up to time t.
In order to deal with strategies contingent on histories, we define the following
notation:
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Definition 2.6. For any n-bidder auction, define for all k ∈ {0, ..., n− 2}
Hk = {(t1, ..., tk)|0 ≤ t1 ≤, ...,≤ tk}
as the set of histories / future contingencies with k drop outs at the respective
prices t1, ..., tk, with the convention H0 = {∅}.
With this notation, a complete action plan prescribes for each history and future
contingency the price at which a bidder of type θ plans to drop out:
Definition 2.7. A pure strategy action plan prescribes a bidding strategy
b :
⋃
0≤k≤n−2
Hk × [θmin, θmax]→ R+,
with the restriction that if for any (t1, ..., tk, θ) we have
b(t1, ..., tk, θ) > tk,
The latter condition on the bidding function ensures that bidders cannot con-
dition their drop out on events that happen after the drop out.
Again, we restrict attention to differentiable and increasing equilibrium bidding
functions in the following sense:
Definition 2.8. A bidding strategy b in the English auction is differentiable and
increasing if for all (t1, ..., tk) ∈
⋃
0≤k≤n−2Hk the function b(t1, ..., tk, θ) is differen-
tiable and increasing in θ.
Example 2.1. Consider a continuous English auction with three loss-averse bid-
ders. A complete strategy prescribes for every θ:
• A price b(θ) at which the bidder drops out if no opponent dropped out before
• For any opponent drop out at some price t < b(θ), a price b(t, θ) at which the
bidder drops out in the subsequent two-bidder auction
The aim of the example is to illustrate, why the optimal strategy b(t, θ) for
the two-bidder auction following the first drop out depends on t.Suppose that all
three bidders bid according to the same symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy
(b(θ), b(t, θ)). Let us focus on the decision problem of a bidder, whose valuation θ
is sufficiently high, such that b(θ) = (1+η)θ were the only time-consistent strategy
in the two-bidder English auction.
Suppose first that an opponent has a valuation of zero and drops out at t = 0.
For the strategy b(0, θ) the bidder is now bound by the set of time-consistent
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strategies of the two-bidder auction, as outlined in Theorem 2.2. Since she has
high beliefs to win, the only time-consistent strategy is b(0, θ) = (1 + η)θ.
Next, we analyze optimal strategies b(t, θ) for t being smaller, but close to
b(θ). Similar to the two-bidder auction, a bidder with a high winning probability
would ex ante like to insure against belief fluctuations with an aggressive strategy.
Any strategy for b(t, θ), however, must be time consistent in the sense that the
bidder is willing to stick to it until t. Just before t the belief to win the auction
has decreased considerably. The bidder trades off the expected gains from trade
against the expected loss from news. The following Lemma states the expected
loss at time t for the three bidder case.
Lemma 2.6. Consider a continuous English auction with three loss-averse bidders.
Assume all bidders follow a symmetric, differentiable, increasing bidding strategy
(b(θ), b(t, θ)). Assume further that no bidder dropped out until t ∈ [b(θmin), b(θmax)].
Let θ(t) be defined by b(θ) = t. Then expected gain-loss utility at time t is given by
Lt(θ) = −Λθ
∫ θ
θ(t)
2g(s)(1−G(s))
(1−G(θ(t)))2
[
G(θ)−G(s)
1−G(s) −
(
G(θ)−G(s)
1−G(s)
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
− ln
(
1−G(θ)
1−G(s)
)
1−G(θ)
1−G(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
]
ds
The terms of Lt(θ) are easy to interpret. At time t the conditional marginal prob-
ability that the first drop out is of type s is given by 2g(s)(1−G(s))
(1−G(θ(t)))2 . In this case, the
bidder would update the winning probability from
(
G(θ)−G(s)
1−G(s)
)2
to G(θ)−G(s)1−G(s) (term
A). Further, term B shows the expected loss for the following 2-bidder auction, as
calculated in Proposition 2.2.
Term A indicates an additional source of expected gain-loss disutility, compared
to the two bidder auction: even if a bidder loses after all, beliefs to win don’t
necessarily gradually decline to zero, but might temporarily increase due to one
opponent dropping out. This effect leads to more belief fluctuations and worsens
bidder’s trade-off between expected news disutility and expected gains from trade.
As a result, it is no longer time consistent to bid up to b(t, θ) = (1− η)θ for all t.
Corollary 2.4. In any symmetric, increasing, differentiable equilibrium (b(θ), b(t, θ))
of the English auction with three loss-averse bidders, expected news disutility for
any θ ∈ (θmin, θmax) satisfies
lim
t→b(θ)
Lt(θ)(
G(θ)−G(θ(t))
1−G(θ(t))
)2 = −2Λθ.
If b(t, θ) is continuous in t, then—by time-consistency—
lim
t→b(θ)
b(t, θ) ≤ (1 + η − Λ)θ.
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Since we have argued above that b(0, θ) = (1+η)θ, the corollary illustrates that
bidding behavior b(t, θ) in general depends on opponents’ drop-out history t.
Even if the sales price depends on all type realizations, it is immediate that for n
bidders the revenue ranking between the two auction format remains: since bidders
generically don’t share the same valuation, in any symmetric continuous increasing
equilibrium they will drop out of the auction consecutively, in order of their types.
Eventually, with probability one, the two bidders with the highest valuation will
end up in the two-bidder subgame. Here they are bound to the constraints on
time-consistent behavior, as analyzed in section 2.4.2. In particular by Lemma 2.3,
any time-consistent strategy for the two-bidder auction satisfies b(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ.
To summarize:
Corollary 2.5. In a symmetric increasing equilibrium of the continuous English
auction with n loss-averse bidders, the revenue may depend on all type realiza-
tions. For any opponent drop-out history, every bidder’s maximal bid is bounded
by b(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ. Thus, with n loss-averse bidders, the English auction remains
to yield lower revenues than the Vickrey auction.
Even if the auction outcome for many bidders is similar to the one for two bid-
ders, it is worth noting that individual bidders obtain less utility, compared to two-
bidder auctions with the same sales price. To see this, consider—hypothetically—
that bidders could choose not to observe individual drop outs, but rather learn in
each period, whether any opponent is still in the game. The auction would then
subjectively resemble an English auction with two bidders, where the opponent’s
type is drawn from the first order-statistic over all opponents. The key difference is
that information is fluctuating much less. As already mentioned earlier and stated
in generality in Proposition 1 of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), the collapse of multiple
signals into one will always weakly decrease gain-loss disutility.
2.7 Conclusion
I studied the effects of expectation-based preferences in dynamic environments,
comparing the dynamic English auction to the static Vickrey auction. If the ref-
erence point is static and doesn’t respond to information, there is no strategic
difference between the English auction and the Vickrey auction. If bidders update
their reference point instantaneously with respect to new information, however, dy-
namic information in the English influences bidders endogenous preferences, and
thus their bidding strategies. The classical strategic equivalence between the the
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two auction formats breaks down and the English auction attains strictly lower
revenue than the Vickrey auction.
This difference highlights the importance of understanding the evolution of the
reference point in dynamic environments. In particular, research about the speed
of reference point adaptation with respect to new information is still in its infancy
and deserves further study.
The non-equivalence of the two auction formats stands in sharp contrast to the
revenue equivalence principles by Vickrey (1961) and Myerson (1981). Indeed, the
powerful approach of mechanism design and the revelation principle relies on the
assumption that agents’ valuations are exogenously given and do not depend on
the choice of mechanism. This assumption is violated if bidders have endogenous
preferences that depend on expectations induced by the mechanism itself. In par-
ticular, if agents update their reference point with respect to new information in
a multi-stage mechanism, such a mechanism cannot be replaced by a simple di-
rect mechanism without changing agents’ incentives. The failure of the revelation
principle naturally leads to the question of optimal mechanism design in dynamic
environments with expectation-based loss-averse agents. The study of optimal ex-
pectation management in these environments leaves an interesting field for future
research.
2.8 Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Theorem 2.3.4. Suppose that all opponents bid according to some increas-
ing, continuously differentiable bidding function b(θ). Since G(θ) is a distribution
with strictly positive, continuous density g, it follows that the distribution of the
maximal opponent bid, H(x) = Gn−1(b−1(x)), is a differentiable distribution with
positive, continuous density h(x) on [b(θmin), b(θmax)] as well.
The bidding function b(θ) constitutes a UPE if and only if the utility function
u(x, θ|b(θ)) attains its maximum at x = b(θ) for all θ. Differentiation with respect
to x yields
∂u(x, θ|b(θ))
∂x
=(θ − x)h(x) + h(x)(1−H(b(θ))µ(θ)− h(x)H(b(θ))µ(−θ).
By dividing by h(x) and evaluating at x = b(θ) we obtion the first-order condition
0 = (θ − b(θ)) + (1−H(b(θ)))ηθ +H(b(θ))ληθ.
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Rearranging yields
b(θ) =
(
1 + η(1−H(b(θ))) + ληH(b(θ)))θ. (2.1)
Using that H(b(θ)) = Gn−1(θ) we obtain
b(θ) =
(
1 + η(1−Gn−1(θ)) + ληGn−1(θ))θ
as the unique equilibrium candidate. For sufficiency note first that
h(b(θ)) =
(Gn−1)′(θ)
b′(θ)
=
(n− 1)Gn−2(θ)g(θ)
(1 + η(1−Gn−1(θ)) + ληGn−1(θ)) + Λ(n− 1)Gn−2(θ)g(θ)θ
is differentiable since g(θ) is differentiable. Now it is immediate that
∂2ui(x, θ|b(θ))
(∂x)2
∣∣
x=b(θ)
= −h(b(θ)) + h′(b(θ)) (θ − b(θ)) + (1−H(b(θ))µ(θ)−H(b(θ))µ(−θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
]
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. By the theorem of the integral over inverse functions, we have∫ b
a
Fi(x)dx = bFi(b)− aFi(a)−
∫ 1
0
cFi(p)dp = b−
∫ 1
0
cFi(p)dp.
Now, it is immediate that∫ b
a
(F1(x)−F2(x))dx = (b−b)−
∫ 1
0
cF1(p)dp+
∫ 1
0
cF2(p)dp =
∫ 1
0
(cF2(p)−cF1(p))dp.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. By applying Lemma 2.1, and using the fact that µ is
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piecewise linear, we can write
E(N(Fi|F ) = ∆N(F1|F ) + (1−∆)N(F2|F )
= ∆
∫ 1
0
µ(cF1(p)− cF (p))dp+ (1−∆)
∫ 1
0
µ(cF2(p)− cF (p))dp
= ∆
∫ b
a
µ(F (x)− F1(x))dx+ (1−∆)
∫ b
a
µ(F (x)− F2(x))dx
= ∆
∫ b
a
µ(F (x)− F1(x))dx+
∫ b
a
µ((1−∆)F (x)− (1−∆)F2(x))dx
= ∆
∫ b
a
µ(F (x)− F1(x))dx+
∫ b
a
µ((1−∆)F (x)− (F (x)−∆F1(x))dx
= ∆
∫ b
a
µ(F (x)− F1(x))dx+
∫ b
a
µ(−∆F (x) + ∆F1(x))dx
= ∆
∫ b
a
µ(F (x)− F1(x))dx+ ∆
∫ b
a
µ(−F (x) + F1(x))dx
= ∆(−λη + η)
∫ b
a
|F (x)− F1(x)|dx
= −∆Λ
∫ b
a
|F (x)− F1(x)|dx
= −∆Λ
∫ 1
0
|cF1(p)− cF (p)|dp.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Suppose the current clock price is t and the opponent
hasn’t dropped out yet. If the clock increases in increments of ε, then the con-
ditional probability that the opponent drops out at the next increment is given
by
∆t :=
F (t+ ε)− F (t)
1− F (t) .
Given her strategy x and that the opponent hasn’t dropped out at t, the bidder
faces the conditional probability of 1−F (x)1−F (t) to lose the auction. Thus, if F
x
t denotes
the belief about payoffs in the good dimension at time t given strategy x, we have
F xt (z) =

1−F (x)
1−F (t) , z < θ,
1, z ≥ θ.
If the bidder wins in the next increment, the belief will update to
F xt+ε(z) =
0, z < θ,1, z ≥ θ.
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According to Proposition 2.1, expected gain-loss utility of the increment from t to
t+ ε is then given by
E(N(F xt+ε|F xt ) = −∆tΛ
∫
|F xt (z)− F xt+ε(z)|dz = −∆tΛ
1− F (x)
1− F (t) θ.
Now, the marginal loss at time t if ε goes to zero reads
`t(x, θ, F ) = lim
ε→0
−∆tΛ1−F (x)1−F (t) θ
ε
=
−f(t)
(1− F (t))2 (1− F (x))Λθ.
To calculate total expected gain-loss utility starting at time t, note that any infor-
mation update at time s > t is only informative and carries gain-loss utility if the
opponent hasn’t already dropped out between t and s, which holds true with the
conditional probability 1−F (s)1−F (t) . Thus
Lt(x, θ, F ) = lim
ε→0
bx−t
ε
c−1∑
i=0
N(F xt+(i+1)ε|F xt+iε)
= lim
ε→0
bx−t
ε
c−1∑
i=0
−1− F (t+ iε)
1− F (t) ∆t+iεΛ
1− F (x)
1− F (t+ iε)θ
=
∫ x
t
−f(s)
1− F (s)
1− F (x)
1− F (t) Λθds
= (ln(1− F (x))− ln(1− F (t))1− F (x)
1− F (t) Λθ
= ln
(
1− F (x)
1− F (t)
)
1− F (x)
1− F (t) Λθ.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. At time t the winning probability is given by the probability
that the opponent drops out between t and x, given he didn’t drop out before t,
thus F (x)−F (t)1−F (t) . Thus, the update changes the probability of getting θ by
F (y)− F (t)
1− F (t) −
F (x)− F (t)
1− F (t) =
F (y)− F (x)
1− F (t) .
Hence,
N(F yt |F xt ) = µ
(
F (y)− F (x)
1− F (t) θ
)
=
µ(F (y)− F (x))
1− F (t) θ.
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Proof of Lemma 2.3. The bidder does not want do deviate to a lower strategy at
any time t, given plan x if and only if
ut(y, θ, F |x) ≤ ut(x, θ, F |x)
for all t ≤ y ≤ x. In particular it is necessary that for all t < x the derivative from
the left satisfies
0 ≤ lim
y↗x
∂ut(y, θ, F |x)
∂y
=
f(x)
1− F (t)
(
θ − x+ ληθ − Λ
(
1 + ln
(
1− F (x)
1− F (t)
))
θ
)
.
This expression is well defined, since F (t) < F (x) < 1. Now, as t approaches x we
get
0 ≤ lim
t→x
f(x)
1− F (t)
(
θ − x+ ληθ − Λ
(
1 + ln
(
1− F (x)
1− F (t)
))
θ
)
=
f(x)
1− F (x) (θ − x+ ληθ − Λθ) .
Since, by assumption, f(x) > 0, this means that necessarily
x ≤ (1 + λη − Λ)θ = (1 + η)θ.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Given opponent’s strategy F and bidder’s type θ, a bid
b(θ) is a personal equilibrium in the auction with commitment if and only if
u0(y, θ, F |b(θ)) ≤ u0(b(θ), θ, F |b(θ))
for all y. In particular, it is necessary that
lim
y↘b(θ)
∂u0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
≤ 0.
Since for y > b(θ) the utility at time zero reads
u0(y, θ, F |b(θ)) =
∫ y
0
(θ−s)dF (s)+η(F (y)−F (b(θ)))θ+ln(1−F (y))(1−F (y))Λθ,
this necessary condition is equivalent to
f(b(θ))
(
θ − b(θ) + ηθ − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ))))θ) ≤ 0.
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In any symmetric equilibrium, the opponent bids according to b(θ) as well, and
therefore we have F (b(θ)) = G(θ). From g(θ) = f(b(θ))b′(θ) and the restriction
that b is increasing it follows that f(b(θ)) > 0. Hence we have
b(θ) ≥ (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ
for any equilibrium candidate. It remains to verify that
b(θ) =
(
1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ
is a personal equilibrium, given opponent’s response b(θ). For this it is sufficient
to show that
∂u0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
≤ 0
for all y > b(θ), and
∂u0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
≥ 0
for all y < b(θ). Note that we can without loss of generality restrict to y ∈ [b(θmin), b(θmax)].
For any such y there exists some θ˜ with y = b(θ˜), since the bidding function is
continuous.
Consider first y > b(θ), thus θ˜ > θ. Then
∂u0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
|y=b(θ˜) = f(b(θ˜))
(
θ − b(θ˜) + ηθ − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜))))θ)
< f(b(θ˜))
(
θ˜ − b(θ˜) + ηθ˜ − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜))))θ˜)
= lim
y↘b(θ˜)
∂u0(y, θ˜, F |b(θ))
∂y
= 0.
Similarly, for y < b(θ), thus θ˜ < θ we have
∂u0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
|y=b(θ˜) = f(b(θ˜))
(
θ − b(θ˜) + ληθ − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜))))θ)
> f(b(θ˜))
(
θ˜ − b(θ˜) + ηθ˜ − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜))))θ˜)
= lim
y↘b(θ˜)
∂u0(y, θ˜, F |b(θ))
∂y
= 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Consider a bidding strategy x.
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Claim 1: If and only if x ≤ (1+η)θ, it is at no time t < x profitable to deviate
to a lower strategy y ∈ [t, x).
Proof: the “only if” has been proved in Lemma 2.3. For the “if”, assume that
x ≤ (1+η)θ. Consider a deviation at some time t < x from x to y ∈ [t, x). We first
look at the change in expected gain-loss disutility: term A can be interpreted as
the change due to different expectations at each time between t and y, while term
B is forgone gain-loss disutility, since the auction necessarily ends at y:
Lt(y, θ, F )− Lt(x, θ, F )
=Λθ
(
ln
(
1− F (y)
1− F (t)
)
1− F (y)
1− F (t) − ln
(
1− F (x)
1− F (t)
)
1− F (x)
1− F (t)
)
=Λθ
(∫ y
t
−f(s)
1− F (s)ds
1− F (y)
1− F (t) −
∫ x
t
−f(s)
1− F (s)ds
1− F (x)
1− F (t)
)
=Λθ
(∫ y
t
−f(s)
1− F (s)ds
1− F (y)
1− F (t) −
∫ y
t
−f(s)
1− F (s)ds
1− F (x)
1− F (t) −
∫ x
y
−f(s)
1− F (s)ds
1− F (x)
1− F (t)
)
=Λθ

∫ y
t
−f(s)
1− F (s)ds
F (x)− F (y)
1− F (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
−
∫ x
y
−f(s)
1− F (s)ds
1− F (x)
1− F (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

≤Λθ
∫ x
y
f(s)
1− F (s)ds
1− F (x)
1− F (t)
<Λθ
∫ x
y
f(s)ds
1− F (x)
(1− F (x))(1− F (t))
=Λθ
F (x)− F (y)
1− F (t)
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Now we have
ut(y, θ, F |x)− ut(x, θ, F |x)
=
1
1− F (t)
(
−
∫ x
y
(θ − s)dF (s) + µ(F (y)− F (x))θ + Λθ(F (x)− F (y))
)
<
F (x)− F (y)
1− F (t) (−θ + x− ληθ + Λθ)
=
F (x)− F (y)
1− F (t) (−(1 + η)θ + x)
≤0.
Thus, there is no profitable deviation to y < x at any time, which concludes the
proof of claim 1.
Claim 1 directly shows the necessity of 1. for any PE. Certainly, 2. is necessary
as well.
Claim 2: If it is not profitable to deviate to a strategy y > x at time t = 0,
then it is not profitable at any time t ≤ x.
Proof: It is not profitable to deviate to a strategy y > x at time t if and only if
0 ≥ ut(y, θ, F |x)− ut(x, θ, F |x)
Now,
ut(y, θ, F |x)− ut(x, θ, F |x)
=
1
1− F (t)
(∫ y
x
(θ − s)dF (s) + µ(F (y)− F (x))θ
)
+ Λθ
(
1− F (y)
1− F (t) ln
(
1− F (y)
1− F (t)
)
− 1− F (x)
1− F (t) ln
(
1− F (x)
1− F (t)
))
=
1
1− F (t)
(∫ y
x
(θ − s)dF (s) + µ(F (y)− F (x))θ ...
...+ Λθ((1− F (y)) ln(1− F (y))− (1− F (x)) ln(1− F (x)) + (F (y)− F (x)) ln(1− F (t)))
)
.
Note that the expression in the big brackets is decreasing in t. Thus, if it is negative
for t = 0, then it is as well negative for all t > 0. Hence, if
0 ≥ u0(y, θ, F |x)− u0(x, θ, F |x)
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then
0 ≥ ut(y, θ, F |x)− ut(x, θ, F |x)
for all t > 0, which concludes the proof of claim 2.
Now we are ready to show sufficiency: assume 1. and 2. hold. Then by claim 1
it can’t be profitable to deviate to a lower strategy at any time. To show that there
is no profitable deviation to a higher strategy, take any time-consistent strategy
y ≥ x. By claim 1 this necessarily means y ∈ [x, (1 + η)θ]. From 2. it follows that
u0(x, θ, F |x) ≥ u0(y, θ, F |x). Then, by claim 2, the agent does not want to deviate
to a higher strategy at any time, and x is indeed a PE.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Take some increasing equilibrium function. By Lemma 2.4,
it satisfies b(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ for all θ ∈ (θmin, θmax). If b(θ) < (1 + η)θ for some
θ, then—again by Lemma 2.4—any y ∈ [x, (1 + η)θ] satisfies u0(x, θ, F |x) ≥
u0(y, θ, F |x). This means that
lim
y↘x
∂u0(y, θ, F |x)
∂y
≤ 0,
which—as we have seen in the proof of Proposition 2.3—straightforwardly solves
to
b(θ) ≥ (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ
in equilibrium. This shows that any increasing equilibrium satisfies 1. and 2. for all
θ ∈ (θmin, θmax). By continuity it also holds for all θ ∈ [θmin, θmax]. Conversely,
assume that b(θ) satisfies 1. and 2. By Lemma 2.4 it only remains to show that for
any
y ∈ [b(θ), (1 + η)θ]
we have
u0(b(θ), θ, F |b(θ)) ≥ u0(y, θ, F |b(θ)).
This condition is trivially satisfied for any θ with b(θ) = (1+η)θ. Consider therefore
θ with b(θ) < (1 + η)θ. It suffices to show that
∂u0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
≤ 0
for all y ∈ [b(θ), (1 + η)θ]. Let y˜ be any of such y. Since
b(θmax) = (1 + η)θmax > (1 + η)θ ≥ y˜ ≥ b(θ),
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and b is continuous, there exists some θ˜ ≥ θ with b(θ˜) = y˜. Now,
∂u0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
∣∣
y=y˜
= [(1 + η)θ − y˜ − Λθ(1 + ln(1− F (y˜)))]f(y˜)
= [(1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜)))))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
θ − b(θ˜)]f(b(θ˜))
≤ [(1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜)))))θ˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤b(θ˜)
−b(θ˜)]f(b(θ˜))
≤ 0.
Proof of Corollary 2.3. We have
(
1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ ≤ (1 + η)θ
if and only if −(1 + ln(1 − G(θ))) ≤ 0, which is equivalent to G(θ) ≤ 1 − 1/e.
Therefore, by Theorem 2.2, a fuction b(θ) is a symmetric equilibrium if and only if
• b(θ) ∈ [(1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ, (1 + η)θ] for G(θ) ≤ 1− 1/e, and
• b(θ) = (1 + η)θ for G(θ) > 1− 1/e.
We determine the utility maximizing equilibrium on the interval where G(θ) ≤ 1− 1/e.
Bidder’s expected utility of a bid x is
u0(x, θ, F |x) =
∫ x
0
(θ − s)dF (s) + Lt(x, θ, F )
=
∫ x
0
(θ − s)dF (s) + Λθ ln(1− F (x))(1− F (x)).
Thus, for any x ≥ (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ
∂u0(x, θ, F |x)
∂x
= (θ − x)f(x)− Λθ(1 + ln(1− F (x)))f(x)
≤ (θ − (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ)f(x)− Λθf(x)
≤ (θ − (1 + η − Λ)θ)f(x)− Λθf(x)
= −f(x)ηθ
< 0.
This shows that the lowest x among all equilibrium strategies yields the highest
utility.
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Finally, since for the PPE
b(θmin) =
(
1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θmin))))θmin = (1 + η − Λ)θmin,
there is underbidding for low types in the PPE if and only if
0 > η − Λ = 2η − λη,
hence if and only if λ > 2.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. For (1) we show that without interim update the equilib-
rium concepts of the static UPE and the dynamic PE coincide. Given type θ
and a continuous belief H on the maximal opponent bid, bidding (up to) b in-
duces the same payoff belief (and therefore reference point) F k(b, θ,H) for k ∈
{money, good} = {m, g} in the Vickrey and the English auction. Consider a bid-
der in the English auction who plans to bid up to b but deviates during the auction
process, such that the final payoff in dimension k ∈ {m, g} is distributed according
to F . If there is no interim updating during the auction, the bidder updates her
reference point only once when the auction is terminated. Integrating the utility
in dimension k for each possible auction outcome yields expected utility of
UEnglish(F |F k(b, θ,H)) =
∫
(x+N(1[x,∞)|F k(b, θ,H)))dF (x)
=
∫ (
x+
∫ 1
0
µ(x− cF (p))dp
)
dF (x)
=
∫ (
x+
∫ ∞
−∞
µ(x− cF (F (s)))dF (s)
)
dF (x)
=
∫ (
x+
∫ ∞
−∞
µ(x− s)dF (s)
)
dF (x)
= UVickrey(F |F k(b, θ,H)).
Thus, equally for the UPE concept in the Vickrey auction and the PE concept in
the English auction, an action b is an equilibrium if and only if for all distributions
(Fm, F g) that are induced by a deviation strategy we have∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k(b, θ,H)|F k(b, θ,H)) ≥
∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k|F k(b, θ,H)).
The subtle difference lies in the fact that a bidder in the Vickrey auction is con-
strained to deviations bˆ ∈ R+, while a bidder in the English auction with multiple
opponents can use complex history dependent deviation strategies, leading to are
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larger set of potential price distributions than in the Vickrey auction. Clearly, if
action b is optimal with respect to all possible deviations in the English auction,
it is in particular optimal with respect to deviations to all history-independent
strategy bˆ ∈ R+. Thus, if bidding up to b is a PE in the English auction, then
bidding b is a UPE in the Vickrey auction. For the converse, assume that b is a
UPE in the Vickrey auction and let (Fm, F g) be the payoff distribution of some
deviation strategy in the English auction. Since H is continuous, there is some bˆ
such that F g(bˆ, θ,H) = F g. Further, since strategy bˆ wins the auction if and only
if the maximal opponent strategy is below bˆ, it is the most cost effective strategy
that wins with probability H(bˆ). Thus the distribution Fm induces weakly higher
costs than Fm(bˆ, θ,H) in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. It follows
that
U(Fm|F k(b, θ,H)) ≤ U(Fm(bˆ, θ,H)|F k(b, θ,H)) ≤ U(Fm(b, θ,H)|F k(b, θ,H)),
and since consequently∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k(b, θ,H)|F k(b, θ,H)) ≥
∑
k∈{m,g}
U(F k|F k(b, θ,H)),
the strategy b is a PE in the English auction.
For (2) note that by Theorem 2.1 the equilibrium bidding function for the
Vickrey auction is given by
bVickrey(θ) = (1 + η + ΛG
n−1(θ))θ,
whereas any equilibrium bidding function in the English auction with instantaneous
reference point updating by Lemma 2.4 satisfies
bEnglish(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ.
Since, by assumption, Gn−1(θ) is strictly increasing, we have Gn−1(θ) > 0 for all
θ > θmin, and the claim follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The structure of the proof is similar to Lange and Ratan
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(2010). The utility function can be simplified to
u(b, θ|b∗) =
∫ b
0
(θ − s)dH(s)
+
∫ b
0
∫ b∗
0
µm(t− s)dH(t)dH(s) + (1−H(b∗))
∫ b
0
µm(−s)dH(s)
+ (1−H(b))
∫ b∗
0
µm(t)dH(t)
+H(b)(1−H(b∗))µg(θ) +H(b∗)(1−H(b))µg(−θ).
Suppose that all opponents bid according to some increasing, continuously dif-
ferentiable bidding function b(θ). Since G(θ) is a distribution with strictly pos-
itive, continuous density g, distribution of the maximal opponent bid H(x) =
Gn−1(b−1(x)) is a differentiable distribution with positive, continuous density h(x)
on [b(θmin), b(θmax)] as well. The bidding function b(θ) constitutes a UPE if and
only if the utility function u(x, θ|b(θ)) attains a maximum at x = b(θ) for all θ.
Differentiation of the utility function with respect to x yields
∂u(x, θ|b(θ))
∂x
=(θ − x)h(x) +
∫ b(θ)
0
µm(t− x)h(x)dH(t) + (1−H(b(θ)))µm(−x)h(x)
− h(x)
∫ b(θ)
0
µm(t)dH(t) + h(x)(1−H(b(θ)))ηgθ + h(x)H(b(θ))λgηgθ.
By dividing by h(x) and evaluating at x = b(θ), we obtain the first-order condition
0
!
=(θ − b(θ)) +
∫ b(θ)
0
µm(t− b(θ))dH(t) + (1−H(b(θ))µm(−b(θ))
−
∫ b(θ)
0
µm(t)dH(t) + (1−H(b(θ)))ηgθ +H(b(θ))λgηgθ
=(θ − b(θ))− λmηm
∫ b(θ)
0
(b(θ)− t)dH(t) + (1−H(b(θ)))(−λgηgb(θ))
− ηm
∫ b(θ)
0
tdH(t) + (1−H(b(θ)))ηgθ +H(b(θ))λgηgθ,
which simplifies to
0 = (1 + ηg)θ − (1 + λmηm)b(θ) + Λm
∫ b(θ)
0
tdH(t) + ΛgH(b(θ))θ. (2.2)
Using that H(b(θ)) = Gn−1(θ) we can rewrite this equation to
0 = (1 + ηg)θ − (1 + λmηm)b(θ) + Λm
∫ θ
0
b(s)dGn−1(s) + ΛgGn−1(θ)θ.
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Differentiation with respect to θ yields
0 = (1 + ηg)− (1 + λmηm)b′(θ) + Λmb(θ)(Gn−1)′(θ) + Λg(Gn−1(θ)θ)′.
The rearranged equation
b′(θ) =
Λm(G
n−1)′(θ)
1 + λmηm
b(θ) +
1 + ηg + Λg(θG
n−1(θ))′
1 + λmηm
is a first-order linear differential equation, which solves to
b(θ) = exp
(
Λm
1 + λmηm
Gn−1(θ)
)(∫ θ
0
1 + ηg + Λg(xG
n−1(x))′
1 + λmηm
exp
(
− Λm
1 + λmηm
Gn−1(x)
)
dx+ C
)
,
where C is the constant of integration. Since G(x) = 0 for x ≤ θmin, we have
b(θmin) = exp(0)
(∫ θmin
0
1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
exp(0)dx+ C
)
=
1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θmin + C.
To determine C, we insert θmin into equation (2.2) and obtain that
0 = (θmin − b(θmin)) + (−λmηmb(θmin)) + ηgθmin,
or equivalently
b(θmin) =
1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θmin,
which shows that C = 0. Now we can use partial integration in order to rewrite
the solution into
b(θ) =
1 + ηg + ΛgG
n−1(θ)
1 + λmηm
θ +
∫ θ
0
Λm(1 + ηg + ΛgG
n−1(x))
(1 + λmηm)2
x exp
(
Λm
1 + λmηm
(Gn−1(θ)−Gn−1(x))
)
dG(x).
Since G(x) = 0 for all x ≤ θmin, we finally have
b(θ) =
1 + ηg + ΛgG
n−1(θ)
1 + λmηm
θ+
∫ θ
θmin
Λm(1 + ηg + ΛgG
n−1(x))
(1 + λmηm)2
x exp
(
Λm
1 + λmηm
(Gn−1(θ)−Gn−1(x))
)
dG(x).
For sufficiency note first that b′(θ) is differentiable, since g(θ) is—by assumption—
differentiable. It follows that
h(b(θ)) =
(Gn−1)′(θ)
b′(θ)
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is differentiable as well. Now it is immediate that
∂2u(x, θ|b(θ))
(∂x)2
∣∣∣∣
x=b(θ)
=
∂
∂x
(
h(x)
∂u(x, θ|b(θ)/∂x)
h(x)
) ∣∣∣∣
x=b(θ)
=h′(b(θ))
(
∂u(x, θ|b(θ)/∂x)
h(x)
) ∣∣∣∣
x=b(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ h(b(θ))
[
−1 +
∫ b(θ)
0
−λmηmdH(t)− λmηm(1−H(b(θ)))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.5. Assume the clock increases in increments of ε and the bidder
plans to bid up to x ∈ (a, b). Assume the clock price is x − ε, and the opponent
has not dropped out yet. We analyze bidders incentives to bid at x given her plan
to do so.
Let ∆ = ∆(ε) = F (x)−F (x−ε)1−F (x−ε) be the probability that the opponent drops out
at x, given he is still in at x− ε. This means the bidder beliefs to win the auction
and get a payoff of (θ,−(x − ε)) with probability ∆. If the bidder bids at x she
receives a utility of
u(x, θ, F |x) = ∆(θ − (x− ε))︸ ︷︷ ︸
classical utility
+∆ (1−∆)(ηgθ − λmηm(x− ε))︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain-loss of winning the auction
+ (1−∆) ∆(−λgηgθ + ηm(x− ε)).︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain-loss of losing the auction
If she drops out before bidding x, she receives
u(x− ε, θ, F |x) = ∆(−λgηgθ + ηm(x− ε))︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain-loss of losing the auction
.
If bidding up to x is time consistent, then
u(x, θ, F |x) ≥ u(x− ε, θ, F |x).
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This is equivalent to
∆[θ − (x− ε) + (1−∆)(ηgθ − λmηm(x− ε))−∆(−λgηgθ + ηm(x− ε))] ≥ 0.
Since F has a positive density, we have ∆ > 0, and it follows
(1 + ηg)θ − (1 + λmηm)(x− ε) + ∆(Λgθ + Λm(x− ε)) ≥ 0.
Since F has no atoms, limε→0 ∆(ε) = 0. Thus, in the limit as the increment size
goes to zero, we obtain
(1 + ηg)θ − (1 + λmηm)x ≥ 0,
or equivalently
x ≤ 1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θ.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. I sketch the main steps of the proof. If a bidder wins the
auction, he has to pay max{b, x} with b being the maximal opponent bid. Given
opponents’ strategies, let HRP (b) be the distribution of the maximal opponent bid
with reserve price x. By replacing s with max{s, x} and t with max{t, x} in the
utility function in section 2.6.1, the utility of a bidder of type θ who bids b with a
reference point as if bidding b∗ is
u(b, θ|b∗) =
∫ b
0
(
−max{s, x}+
∫ b∗
0
µm(max{t, x} −max{s, x})dHRP (t)
)
dHRP (s)
+
∫ b
0
∫ ∞
b∗
µm(−max{s, x})dHRP (t)dHRP (s)
+
∫ ∞
b
(∫ b∗
0
µm(max{t, x})dHRP (t) +
∫ ∞
b∗
µm(0)dHRP (t)
)
dHRP (s)
+
∫ b
0
(
θ +
∫ b∗
0
µg(0)dHRP (t) +
∫ ∞
b∗
µg(θ)dHRP (t)
)
dHRP (s)
+
∫ ∞
b
(∫ b∗
0
µg(−θ)dHRP (t) +
∫ ∞
b∗
µg(0)dHRP (t)
)
dHRP (s).
Following the derivation of the necessary condition for a symmetric increasing equi-
librium13 in the proof of Theorem 2.4 with this modified utility function, we obtain
13The proof of existence of a symmetric increasing continuous equilibrium bidding function
bRP (θ) with reserve price, and its uniqueness for θ with b(θ) ≥ x is omitted. It is a modification
of Proof 2.4.
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for all θ with bRP (θ) ≥ x the following modification of equation (2.2):
0 =(1 + ηg)θ − (1 + λmηm)bRP (θ) + ΛgHRP (bRP (θ))θ + Λm
∫ bRP (θ)
0
ydHRP (y) +HRP (x)x.
Rearranging yields
bRP (θ) =
1
1 + λmηm
(
(1 + ηg)θ + ΛgHRP (bRP (θ)) + Λm
∫ bRP (θ)
x
ydHRP (y) +HRP (x)x
)
.
Let θ be defined by b(θ) = x. We need to show that b(θ) < bRP (θ) for any θ ≥ θ.
Assume otherwise, and let θ˜ = min{θ ∈ [θ, θmax]|b(θ) ≥ bRP (θ)}. The minimum
exists by continuity of b and bRP . Now we have
b(θ˜) =
1
1 + λmηm
(
(1 + ηg)θ˜ + ΛgH(b(θ˜)) + Λm
∫ b(θ˜)
0
ydH(y)
)
<
1
1 + λmηm
(
(1 + ηg)θ˜ + ΛgH(b(θ˜)) + Λm
∫ b(θ˜)
b(θ)
ydH(y) +H(x)x
)
=
1
1 + λmηm
(
(1 + ηg)θ˜ + ΛgG
n−1(θ˜) + Λm
∫ θ˜
θ
b(s)dGn−1(s) +Gn−1(θ)x
)
≤ 1
1 + λmηm
(
(1 + ηg)θ˜ + ΛgG
n−1(θ˜) + Λm
∫ θ˜
θ
bRP (s)dG
n−1(s) +Gn−1(θ)x
)
=
1
1 + λmηm
(
(1 + ηg)θ˜ + ΛgHRP (bRP (θ˜)) + Λm
∫ bRP (θ˜)
bRP (θ)
ydHRP (y) +HRP (bRP (θ))x
)
≤ 1
1 + λmηm
(
(1 + ηg)θ˜ + ΛgHRP (bRP (θ˜)) + Λm
∫ bRP (θ˜)
x
ydHRP (y) +HRP (x)x
)
= bRP (θ˜),
a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. For any given opponent strategy distribution F , the im-
plementation of a reserve price x is perceived by the bidder as if playing against a
distribution
FRP (z) =
0, z < x,F (z), z ≥ x.
In particular FRP (z) = F (z) for all z ≥ x. Following Lemma 2.4, a strategy x > x
is a PE if and only if
1. x ≤ (1 + η)θ
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2. For any y ∈ [x, (1 + η)θ] we have u0(x, θ, F |x) ≥ u0(y, θ, F |x).
Since for any y, x > x we have
u0(y, θ, FRP |x) = u0(y, θ, F |x),
these conditions remain unchanged under a reserve price of x. Therefore, the set
of symmetric equilibria for two loss-averse bidders remains unchanged as well.
Proof of Lemma 2.6. From the perspective of a representative bidder, we denote
with F (x) the distribution of prices, at which a particular opponent drops out,
i.e. F (b(θ)) = G(θ). Similarly we denote with Ft(x) the distribution of drop-out
prices of the remaining opponent, given the other opponent drops out at t. Since
the remaining opponent j didn’t drop out until t, his type θj necessarily satisfies
θj > θ(t), and therefore
Ft(b(t, θ)) = Prob(θj ≤ θ|θj > θ(t)) = G(θ)−G(θ(t))
1−G(θ(t)) .
If we denote with L2,t expected gain-loss utility in the two-bidder subgame following
an opponent’s drop out at price t, then by Proposition 2.2
L2,t(θ) = ln
(
1− Ft(b(t, θ))
1− Ft(t)
)
1− Ft(b(t, θ))
1− Ft(t) Λθ
= ln(1− Ft(b(t, θ))(1− Ft(b(t, θ))Λθ
= ln
(
1−G(θ)
1−G(θ(t))
)
1−G(θ)
1−G(θ(t)) .
For the 3-bidder auction leading to the first drop out, consider first price increments
of ε. Suppose the clock is at price s and both opponents are still remaining. Since
we restrict to symmetric increasing bidding functions, a bidder of type θ wins the
auction if and only if both opponents have a type lower that θ. Given that they
didn’t drop out until s, this holds true with probability
(
G(θ)−G(θ(s))
1−G(θ(s))
)2
.
The probability that a particular opponent j drops out at the next increment
is
∆(s) =
F (s+ ε)− F (s)
1− F (s) .
At the next increment s+ ε there are three possibilities:
• With probability (∆(s))2 both opponents drop out. The bidder wins with
certainty, which induces a gain of
(
1−
(
G(θ)−G(θ(s))
1−G(θ(s))
)2)
ηθ.
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• With probability 2∆(s)(1−∆(s)) exactly one opponent drops out. The bidder
updates her belief to win, which induces a gain of(
G(θ)−G(θ(s+ε))
1−G(θ(s+ε)) −
(
G(θ)−G(θ(s))
1−G(θ(s))
)2)
ηθ.
• With probability (1−∆(s))2 no opponent drops out, which induces a loss of((
G(θ)−G(θ(s+ε))
1−G(θ(s+ε))
)2 − (G(θ)−G(θ(s))1−G(θ(s)) )2)ληθ.
Since F is continuous, ∆(s) approaches zero, as the increment size goes to zero.
Therefore, in the limit for the continuous English auction, the probability that
both opponents drop out at the same time is of second order and has no impact
on expected gain-loss utility. Applying Proposition 2.1, expected gain-loss utility
in the increment from s to s + ε for small ε with both opponents being active
approaches
Ls+ε(θ)−Ls(θ) = −2∆(s)(1−∆(s))
(
G(θ)−G(θ(s+ ε))
1−G(θ(s+ ε)) −
(
G(θ)−G(θ(s))
1−G(θ(s))
)2)
Λθ.
As the increment size goes to zero, in the limit the marginal expected gain-loss
utility with both opponents being active at time s is given by
`(s)(θ) =
−2f(s)
1− F (s)
(
G(θ)−G(θ(s))
1−G(θ(s)) −
(
G(θ)−G(θ(s))
1−G(θ(s))
)2)
Λθ.
At time t, the probability that time s > t is reached without at least one opponent
drop out is
(
1−F (s)
1−F (t)
)2
. Consequently the marginal probability of a drop out at
s—which triggers the 2-bidder auction with expected loss L2,s—is
∂
∂s
(
(1− F (s))2
(1− F (t))2
)
=
2f(s)(1− F (s))
(1− F (t))2 .
Putting the two sources of gain-loss utility together and integrating over s yields
Lt(θ) =
∫ b(θ)
t
((
1− F (s)
1− F (t)
)2
`(s) +
2f(s)(1− F (s))
(1− F (t))2 L2,s(θ)
)
ds
=− Λθ
∫ b(θ)
t
2f(s)(1− F (s))
(1− F (t))2
(
G(θ)−G(θ(s))
1−G((θ(s)) −
(G(θ)−G(θ(s))
1−G(θ(s))
)2)
ds
+ Λθ
∫ b(θ)
t
2f(s)(1− F (s))
(1− F (t))2 ln
(
1−G(θ)
1−G(θ(s))
)
1−G(θ)
1−G(θ(s))ds
Since F (s) = G(θ(s)) and consequently f(s) = g(θ(s))/b′(θ(s)), integration by
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substitution yields
Lt(θ) = −Λθ
∫ θ
θ(t)
2g(s)(1−G(s))
(1−G(θ(t)))2
[
G(θ)−G(s)
1−G(s) −
(
G(θ)−G(s)
1−G(s)
)2
−ln
(
1−G(θ)
1−G(s)
)
1−G(θ)
1−G(s)
]
ds
Proof of Corollary 2.4. Define
δ(s) =
G(θ)−G(s)
1−G(s)
Since for θ < θmax we have δ(s) < 1, and we can use the power series of the
logarithm to rewrite
Lt(θ) = −Λθ
∫ θ
θ(t)
2g(s)(1−G(s))
(1−G(θ(t)))2
[
δ(s)−(δ(s))2−(−δ(s)−δ(s)
2
2
−δ(s)
3
3
...)(1−δ(s))]ds
Since lims→θ δ(s) = 0, we have
lim
t→b(θ)
Lt(θ)(
G(θ)−G(θ(t))
1−G(θ(t))
)2
= lim
t→b(θ)
−Λθ
∫ θ
θ(t)
2g(s)(1−G(s))
(G(θ)−G(θ(t))2
[
δ(s)− (δ(s))2 − (−δ(s)− δ(s)
2
2
...)(1− δ(s))]ds
= lim
(θ(t)→θ
−Λθ
∫ θ
θ(t)
2g(s)(1−G(s))
(G(θ)−G(θ(t))2
[
δ(s)− (δ(s))2 − (−δ(s)− δ(s)
2
2
...)(1− δ(s))]ds
= lim
θ(t)→θ
−Λθ
∫ θ
θ(t)
2g(s)(1−G(s))
(G(θ)−G(θ(t))2 2δ(s)ds
= lim
θ(t)→θ
−2Λθ
∫ θ
θ(t)
2g(s)(G(θ)−G(s))
(G(θ)−G(θ(t))2 ds
= lim
θ(t)→θ
−2Λθ
[−(G(θ)−G(s))2
(G(θ)−G(θ(t))2
]θ
θ(t)
= lim
θ(t)→θ
−2Λθ
=− 2Λθ
Now, since b(t, θ) is continuous in t, limt→b(θ) b(t, θ) exists. We prove the threshold
of time-consistent behavior for (θmin, θmax) by contradiction. For the boundaries it
follows by continuity. Assume that there is some θ ∈ (θmin, θmax) with
lim
t→b(θ)
b(t, θ) > (1 + η − Λ)θ.
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Since b(t, θ) is continuous there is some tˆ < b(θ) and θˆ ∈ [θ(tˆ), θ], such that
b(t, θ) > (1 + η − Λ)θ
for all t ∈ [tˆ, b(θ)], θ ∈ [θˆ, θ]. This implies that the sales price for the good exceeds
(1+η−Λ)θ if no bidder drops out until tˆ. If b(t, θ) is a time-consistent strategy, then
at time tˆ a bidder of type θ must weakly prefer this strategy to an instantaneous
drop out. Since at time tˆ her belief to win is
(
G(θ)−G(θ(tˆ))
1−G(θ(tˆ))
)2
, this condition reads
−ληθ
(
G(θ)−G(θ(tˆ))
1−G(θ(tˆ))
)2
<
(
G(θ)−G(θ(tˆ))
1−G(θ(tˆ))
)2
(θ − (1 + η − Λ)θ) + Ltˆ(θ),
with strict inequality since the price strictly exceeds (1+η−Λ)θ. This is equivalent
to
Ltˆ(θ) > −2Λθ
(
G(θ)−G(θ(tˆ))
1−G(θ(tˆ))
)2
,
a contradiction for tˆ sufficiently close to b(θ).

Chapter 3
Persuasion against Self-Control
Problems
This Chapter is based on von Wangenheim (2018).
3.1 Introduction
Evidence suggests that many consumers have self-control problems (DellaVigna
(2009)): In order to receive instantaneous gratification from consumption, they
overconsume products which create long-term health risks. The finding that con-
sumers act against their own interest has led to various suggestions on possible
paternalistic policies to help consumers make better choices: nudges in form of
default options (Thaler and Sunstein (2003)), optimal “sin-taxes” on unhealthy
products (O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006)), or simple prohibition of drugs as imple-
mented in most countries.
I propose optimal information design by a social planner as an alternative ap-
proach to induce consumption behavior that is (more) aligned with consumers’ long
run interests.
I draw a connection between the dynamic consumption model with quasi-
hyperbolic discounting consumers by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and the opti-
mal information design approach by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), and derive a
consumer-optimal information signal about the consumers’ risk type. The derived
optimal signal consists of a simple binary signal, which displays whether or not the
risk is below some threshold. It is therefore consistent with commonly observed rec-
ommendations by experts as well as certified product labels which require products
to satisfy legally defined limits on harmful substances.
I consider an infinite horizon discrete time model, where the consumer may
86
CHAPTER 3. PERSUASION AGAINST SELF-CONTROL PROBLEMS 87
consume one unit of a good each period. Consumption induces instantaneous util-
ity, but gives rise to a negative future externality with unknown probability. For
instance, consider food products where the consumption risk of obesity or dia-
betes are a priori not transparent. Similarly, smoking, lack of sports, or other
unhealthy activities feature health risks that may depend on genetic predispo-
sitions only testable by medical experts. The consumer has a strong value for
instantaneous gratification in form of quasi-hyperbolic preferences, which leads to
time-inconsistent preferences (Laibson (1997)).
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) find that in this model there is value of rational
inattention with respect to the risk parameter: Even though information helps a
consumer to achieve a better myopic consumption choice, any information is shared
with future incarnations and may lead to future overconsumption due to the present
bias. Thus, rational inattention may work as a commitment device towards future
incarnations to enable more favorable long-term consumption choices.
I follow the normative approach suggested by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002,
2003) in defining consumer welfare as ex-ante consumer utility before facing con-
sumption decisions.1 As a social planner therefore takes the perspective of the
consumer at time 0, the model can equivalently be regarded as a model of self-
persuasion, in which not the regulator but the consumer himself strategically ac-
quires information some time before he faces the consumption decision.
For the analysis of the optimal information signal, I distinguish two cases.
First, I analyze the consumer-optimal signal when the consumer has no access
to further information before making the consumption decisions. As the incentives
of a welfare maximizing planner are aligned with the consumer whenever he does
not face an instantaneous consumption decision, this seems appropriate where in-
formation is not immediately available at reasonable cost. For instance, it seems
very implausible that a consumer would first conduct a medical test on his risk
type, whenever he instantaneously faces the opportunity to smoke.
I show that in this case the optimal signal consists of a risk threshold together
with the simple information whether the risk type is above or below the thresh-
old. Similar to Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), this signal improves welfare upon
full information: While under full information the present bias leads to inefficient
consumption of intermediate risk types, this cut-off signal pools (some of) these
intermediate types with high risk types, and induces them to abstention. For many
distributions, the optimal signal can implement first-best welfare.
There are numerous examples where institutions implicitly use cut-off signals in
form of recommendations, guidelines or definitions, when consumers themselves fail
1This approach implies that quasi-hyperbolic discounting is regarded as an “error”.
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to thoroughly interpret data. Definitions of obesity, limits for responsible drinking,
classification of medical risk groups are only some examples. Moreover, certification
in form of labels—such as the European Union eco label and energy label—are
commonly based on predefined thresholds.
While there may also be other motives for the use of simple information, my
model provides a novel rationale for the use of these tools in regulation. In partic-
ular, it provides an instruction on how such tools may be used to incentivize more
preferable consumption decisions.
As a second case, I assume that consumers can acquire costless additional in-
formation at any time. This assumption seems pertinent in situations where the
consumer can instantaneously access relevant product information online. In the
welfare maximizing Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, the provided ex-ante
information, again, consists of a simple cut-off signal, and consumers don’t acquire
further relevant information. Moreover, I show that under some regularity con-
ditions on the risk distribution, this signal coincides with the optimal signal in
case of full information control by the planner, and consequently achieves the same
welfare. Intuitively, consumers abstain from acquiring more precise information as
they fear that they will eventually end up in the full information equilibrium and
overconsume forever.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In Section 3.2, I discuss
the related literature. In Section 3.3, I introduce the model. I start Section 3.4
with the benchmark of full information, before I analyze the case of full information
control by the planner, and the case of costless consumer learning. Section 3.5
concludes this chapter. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3.2 Related Literature
There is substantial evidence that individuals have dynamically inconsistent time
preferences (Frederick et al. (2002), DellaVigna (2009)). As a common feature,
discount rates increase as the date approaches. The employed (β, δ)-model of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting dates back to Phelps and Pollak (1968), who used it to
model imperfect inter-generational altruism. Laibson (1997) was first to use it in
the context of an intra-personal conflict. It has arguably become the standard
model of time-inconsistent preferences.
The existence of self-control problems and time-inconsistent preferences inher-
ently gives value to devices that enable individuals to commit to future actions.
Many papers have analysed how the market can offer such a device by selling ad-
equate goods such as illiquid assets (Laibson (1998), Diamond and Ko¨szegi (2003)),
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rationed quantities (Wertenbroch (1998)), or long-term memberships (DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2006)).
This chapter connects to another strand of the literature where individuals use
belief manipulation as an intrapersonal commitment device. Be´nabou and Tirole
(2002) show how endogenously chosen imperfect recall may lead to overconfidence
to overcome motivational problems. Brocas and Carrillo (2000) show how informa-
tion avoidance can be welfare increasing under time-inconsistent preferences. This
chapter builds on the dynamic consumption model by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000).
Consumption yields instantaneous utility but with unknown risk some delayed cost.
They show that individuals with time-inconsistent preferences may prefer to ab-
stain from information acquisition on the risk parameter, even if information is
costless. Consumers, who have the ability to sample information according to a
Bernoulli process, may fear to be trapped in inefficient consumption forever for
intermediate risk estimates. In order to avoid this overconsumption they may stop
sampling at beliefs that induce abstention.
While Carrillo and Mariotti show that there is value of stopping Bernoulli
sampling, I derive the optimal information policy for their consumption model,
when the consumer (or a regulator on behalf of the consumer) is unconstrained
in the ability to design information signals (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)), and
derive precise conditions when the optimal signal induces first-best consumption
utility.
This chapter also relates to the literature on paternalistic motives. In the con-
text of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) study
the optimal paternalistic tax, when consumption exerts a negative utility on fu-
ture periods. Arguably, the regulation of information is—at least if information is
freely available—a much softer form of paternalism than sin taxes. The provided
information with its implicit consumption recommendation can be interpreted as
a default action, which the consumer may or may not follow. If we think of infor-
mation being available at some very small cost, my model is more in the spirit of
libertarian paternalism, and relates to the example in Thaler and Sunstein (2003),
where the planner of a cafeteria may place dessert in a further location to induce
small transaction costs for its consumption.
Based on the work of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), there has been a quickly
evolving literature on Bayesian persuasion and information design. Yet, very little
is known about optimal sequential information design by conflicting parties. Li
and Norman (2017) study sequential persuasion with multiple senders. Similar to
my model, attention can be restricted to equilibria in which information is only
provided in the first period. Terstiege and Wasser (2017) analyze buyer-otpimal
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information structures in a monopoly that are robust to additional information
provision by the seller. To my best knowledge, this chapter provides the first
dynamic model in which the receiver himself may acquire addition information
before choosing an action.
3.3 The Model
The consumption model with intertemporal preferences closely follows Carrillo and
Mariotti (2000). Consider an infinite discrete time model, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ....
In every period t ≥ 1, a risk-neutral consumer decides whether he wants to consume
one unit of an indivisible good. Consumption induces an instantaneous utility
normalized to one. Let therefor xt ∈ {0, 1} denote the consumption choice at time
t.2
Consumption exerts a negative externality on the welfare of future periods.
More precisely, consumption at time t reduces the consumer’s utility in period
t + τ with probability θ by an amount cτ ∈ [0, c] for all τ ≥ 1. In particular, the
magnitude of the externalities is assumed to be independent of past consumption
choices.
The probability θ of a realization of the externality is unknown to the consumer.
It is distributed according to some prior distribution with cdf F0 and continuous,
positive density f0(θ) on support [0, 1].
3 However, at time 0 a regulator on behalf
of the consumer may design an information signal about θ, which the consumer
observes at no cost. In the beginning of any subsequent period the consumer
may acquire further information about θ. Details on the informational process are
explained after the characterization of the intrapersonal conflict.
Intertemporal payoffs and intrapersonal conflict
The instantaneous expected utility ut at each date t consists of the potential con-
sumption utility and the expected externality costs ct−τθ, acquired in former peri-
ods τ ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}, i.e.
ut = xt −
t−1∑
τ=1
xτ ct−τθ.
2As Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) point out, the restriction to binary decisions is without loss of
generality. Indeed, whenever the consumer decides to consume, he wishes to consume the maximal
amount.
3I follow Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) in assuming that the magnitude of the externality is
known to consumers, whereas its probability of occurrence is unknown. It is straightforward
to derive an equivalent model where the externality occurs with certainty, but its magnitude is
unknown.
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To abstract away from updating the value of θ due to the realization of the
externality, I follow Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) in assuming that the consumer
does not observe his current utility.
As a key assumption, I assume the consumer has present-biased preferences as
developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and employed by Laibson (1996, 1997): The
consumer at time t assigns a discount factor of βδτ (β, δ < 1) to the instantaneous
utility in period t + τ (τ ≥ 1). Utility from the consumer’s perspective at time t
(in the following called “self-t”) then reads
Ut = ut + β
∞∑
τ=1
δτut+τ .
The parameter β can be regarded as the “impatience” or “impulsiveness” (Ainslie
(1992)). In contrast to classical exponential discounting, this quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting leads to decisions that are time inconsistent: The optimal contingent plan
of self-t for consumption in some future period t+ τ may not longer be optimal to
implement for self-t+ τ , as self-t+ τ has a strong taste for instantaneous gratifica-
tion.
Consequently, the collection of different selves of the consumer play a non-
cooperative game against each other. To focus on this intra-personal conflict, I
assume that the consumer has no commitment power towards his future selfs.
The main scope of this chapter is to analyze to which extend optimal information
provision in the sense of Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) can
mitigate the time-inconsistency problem and increase consumer’s utility.
Besides his self control problem the consumer behaves fully rational: he per-
fectly anticipates his behavior and has perfect recall.
Information Provision and Learning
Consider now the role of a welfare maximizing regulator. Given the conflict be-
tween the desires of different consumer selfs, it is a priori unclear how to define
an appropriate welfare function. I follow the approach suggested by O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2002, 2003) and pursued by many others in focusing on the welfare of
self-0. Thus, the regulator takes the perspective of the consumer before he faces
any consumption decision.
Definition 3.1. A signal structure for θ consists of a finite signal space
S = {s1, ..., sn} together with a joint distribution G on the measurable space
([0, 1]×S,B([0, 1]×S)), where B([0, 1]×S) is the induced Borel algebra. Defining
the joint distribution the usual way by G(θ˜, s˜) = Pr(θ ≤ θ˜, s ≤ s˜), we say S is
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consistent with belief F about θ, if for all θ ∈ [0, 1] the marginal distributions
satisfy
G(θ, sn) = F (θ).
At time 0 the regulator may costlessly provide any F0-consistent signal structure
S0 about the risk type θ. Observing a signal realization s, the consumer forms pos-
terior belief F1 according to the conditional distribution G(·|s). We can for example
think of a costless health check which reveals some information about individual
health risk of smoking, or some legal requirements for product labelling, which pro-
vides the consumer with some (incomplete) information about the (un)healthiness
of food products.
In many circumstances it seems plausible that the regulator has exclusive con-
trol over information in the sense that it is too costly for the agent to acquire
additional information himself whenever he faces a consumption decision.4
In other environments the consumer may be able to instantaneously find rele-
vant information online at (almost) no cost.
In the following analysis, I therefore consider two cases. First, I analyze the
optimal signal structure whenever the regulator (or self-0) has full control over
information. Then, I consider the case where the consumer may acquire additional
information each period before the consumption decision. Formally, at time t ≥ 1
the consumer may design any signal structure St that is consistent with the belief
Ft derived from Bayesian updating in period t− 1.
Whenever we think of the case of full information control by the regulator we
formally restrict consumer’s information acquisition at any time t ≥ 1 to the trivial
signal S = {s}.
Equilibrium Concept
In each period t ≥ 1, a strategy for the consumer consists of a learning decision
in form of a signal St, and the consumption decision xt ∈ {0, 1}, based on the
posterior derived from updating with respect to the signal. Since the payoff relevant
information at the beginning period t is captured by belief Ft, and is independent
of time, it is natural to focus on Markov strategies.
Definition 3.2. A Markov strategy for the consumer prescribes for each belief
F an F -consistent signal structure SF , and for each signal realization s ∈ SF a
consumption decision x(F, s) ∈ {0, 1}.
4As the regulator’s interest is aligned with the consumer whenever the consumer does not face
an instantaneous consumption decision, an alternative interpretation of the model would be that
at time zero—say at home—the consumer himself has costless access to information about his risk
type, whereas in the situation of consumption—say in the supermarket—such information would
be excessively costly as it is not directly available.
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Certainly, as the consumption decision has no impact on future behavior, the
consumer optimally consumes whenever consumption utility exceeds expected ex-
ternality cost, given the updated belief from signal s. Formally, in any equilibrium
we have x(F, s) = 1 if and only if
1 >
( ∞∑
τ=1
βδτ cτ
)
E[θ|F, s].
Definition 3.3. We say a subgame perfect equilibrium of the prescribed game is
a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), if the consumer’s strategy for t ≥ 1 forms a
Markov strategy. We say a Markov perfect equilibrium is preferred, if it maximizes
self-0’s utility among all Markov perfect equilibria.
The solution concept to the game will be preferred Markov perfect equilibrium
(PMPE). To ensure existence, the following assumption is maintained throughout
the chapter.
Assumption 3.1. The consumer breaks any tie in favor of the regulator: When-
ever the consumer at any time is indifferent between preferred signal structures or
the two consumption decision, he takes the decision that maximizes utility of self-0.
We will see that the unique PMPE arises naturally in this context: the regulator
provides information which can be interpreted as a consumption recommendation.
The consumer finds it optimal to follow the consumption recommendation and
abstains from further information acquisition.
3.4 Analysis
Let
C =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ cτ
be the present value magnitude of the externality without present bias. The fol-
lowing condition is assumed to hold for the remainder of the chapter.
Assumption 3.2. If the consumer knows with certainty that the externality real-
izes he prefers to abstain, i.e.
βC > 1.
The full learning benchmark
In order to understand the benefit of incomplete information, it is insightful to first
analyze benchmark where the consumer has complete information about θ.
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From the perspective of self-0, the expected value of consumption at any time
t ≥ 1 is
δt(βxt − βxtCθ),
thus consumption is optimal if and only if θ ≤ 1C . However, the value of instanta-
neous consumption for self-t is
xt − xtβCθ.
Consumption therefore is optimal for self-t if and only if θ ≤ 1βC . Hence, a conflict
of interest between self-0 and self-t arises if and only if θ ∈ [ 1C , 1βC ], where self-t
will consume even though his past selves would have liked to commit to abstention.
The loss due to the lack of commitment power is depicted in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Welfare loss under complete information
The dashed line depicts the self-t’s utility from his optimal consumption decision
in period t to consume whenever θ ≤ 1C . The solid line represents self-0’s (δt-
undiscounted) utility of self-t’s decision. From the perspective of self-0, the shaded
area illustrates the loss of self-t’s action compared to self-0’s preferred action.
From an ex-ante perspective total expected utility under complete information
is
EUfull info =
∞∑
t=1
βδt
∫ 1
βC
0
(1− Cθ)f(θ)dθ = δβ
1− δ
∫ 1
βC
0
(1− Cθ)f(θ)dθ.
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Compared to the first-best utility
EUfirst best =
∞∑
t=1
βδt
∫ 1
C
0
(1− Cθ)f(θ)dθ = δβ
1− δ
∫ 1
C
0
(1− Cθ)f(θ)dθ,
the commitment problem induces a welfare loss of
Loss =
δβ
1− δ
∫ 1
βC
1
C
(1− Cθ)f(θ)dθ.
In the following we will see how less information about θ may induce self-t to
consumption choices that are more aligned with the interest of self-0.
Full Information Control
In this section, I analyze the equilibrium, when the regulator has full control over
the information provided to consumers.
Since there is no information acquisition at any t ≥ 1, and we restrict to Markov
strategies, the consumption choices are history-independent and identical at all
times. Consequently, the regulator faces a classical persuasion problem in the
sense of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Recall that there is a conflict of interest
between the regulator and consumer’s self t ≥ 1 if and only if θ ∈ [ 1C , 1βC ]. In her
position of an information sender, the regulator’s objective is to let the consumer
receive information, which induces him to abstain in the conflicting interval as
much as possible.
The solution to the regulator’s problem is to use a cut-off strategy. She will
inform the consumer, whether his risk type θ is above or below some threshold y.
Proposition 3.1. If the regulator has full control over information, the welfare
maximizing signal structure is described by a threshold y ∈ [ 1C , 1βC ), and the signal
S =
s1, θ < y,s2, θ ≥ y.
The consumer consumes if and only if θ < y.
1. If
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ > 1
C
]
≥ 1
βC
then y = 1C , and the signal induces first best welfare.
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2. If
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ > 1
C
]
<
1
βC
then y is uniquely determined by the condition that E [θ|θ > y] = 1βC . Welfare
under S strictly exceeds welfare under full information.
As the consumer abstains if and only if his expected risk θ weakly exceeds 1βC ,
the regulator pools as many types as possible from conflicting interval θ ∈ [ 1C , 1βC ]
with high risk types by maintaining an expected risk weakly above 1βC . Within
this interval the regulator prefers to induce abstention for the high types for two
reasons: Firstly, for those types consumption creates the highest disutility to self-0,
secondly, the regulator is able to pool more types while maintaining an expected
risk above 1βC .
The optimal signal can be interpreted as an incentive compatible recommenda-
tion by the regulator to the consumer. Given consumer’s risk type, the regulator
recommends whether to consume or abstain, and the consumer wishes to follow
the recommendation.
There are numerous real-world examples where regulators give recommenda-
tions in form of consumption thresholds. For instance, many governments have
adopted guidelines that define thresholds for responsible alcohol consumption (Kali-
nowski and Humphreys (2016)). the world health organization (WHO) defines a
body mass index of 25kg/m2 as the cut-off point for overweight.5
Moreover, labels are a common tool to provide consumption recommendation on
the basis of thresholds. For instance, in 2006 the Food Standard Agency (FSA) in
the UK introduced a traffic light rating system for food nutrition values. Products
with sugar or saturated fats above certain thresholds are highlighted with a red
light to display the health risk of the product. Further, the organic food label
by the European Union defines minimum requirements for food to be labelled as
organic.6 Proposition 3.1 describes how to choose the respective thresholds in order
to induce the welfare maximizing consumption decision for consumers.
To better understand the conflict of interest between self-0 and self-t, I derive
the information signal at time 0 that is not preferred by self-0 but by self-t for
t ≥ 1. Again, as all consumer incarnations have the same information, any Markov
strategy prescribes the same consumption decision to all incarnations. The follow-
ing Lemma derives the preferred consumption decision of self-t if the decision has
to be the same at all times t.
5http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/37003/1/WHO TRS 854.pdf
6(EC) No. 889/2008 and (EC) No. 834/2007
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Lemma 3.1. If all consumers have to take the same consumption decision rule
x(θ) ∈ {0, 1}, then the optimal decision rule from the perspective of self-t for t ≥ 1
is
x(θ) = 1 if and only if θ ≤ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
Recall that the first best consumption choice of self-0 was to consume if and
only if θ ≤ 1C , while the optimal myopic decision under full information was to
consume if and only if θ ≤ 1βC . The optimal consumption threshold is a weighted
average between these two objectives as it trades off self-t’s instantaneous gain from
high consumption with the loss that all future incarnations will consume equally
much. The higher the long-run discount factor δ the more weight the consumer
puts on the long run utility. The lower δ, the stronger is the consumer’s desire for
instant gratification.
Following the argument of Proposition 3.1 with this objective, one immediately
obtains
Corollary 3.1. If self-t for t ≥ 1 has full control over information provided by
the regulator, the welfare maximizing signal structure is described by a threshold
y ∈ [δ 1C + (1− δ) 1βC , 1βC ), and the signal
S =
s1, θ < y,s2, θ ≥ y.
The consumer consumes if and only if θ < y.
1. If
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ > δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
]
≥ 1
βC
then y = δ 1C + (1 − δ) 1βC , and the signal implements self-t’s preferred con-
sumption decision rule.
2. If
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ > δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
]
<
1
βC
then y is uniquely determined by the condition that E [θ|θ > y] = 1βC . Welfare
under S strictly exceeds welfare under full information.
Costless Learning
I now look at the case, where the consumer may learn additional information
costlessly at any time.
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I begin the analysis with the observation that the consumer never benefits from
postponing the acquisition of relevant information.
Definition 3.4. Consider a Markov perfect equilibrium. An information signal
SF is relevant, if acquiring SF when the belief is F at any time t induces different
expected utility to self-t or self-0 than acquiring no information.
Lemma 3.2. On equilibrium path in a Markov perfect equilibrium the consumer
will not acquire relevant information signals at any time t > 1.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Any acquired information by
self-t (t ≥ 1) can only help to improve his consumption decision. The only incentive
for self-t to remain nevertheless uninformed about θ is to “discipline” future selfs
to take a more favorable consumption decision. If self-t anticipates that self-t + 1
will acquire additional information anyway, self-t (weakly) prefers to acquire that
information herself.
Note that the regulator and self-1 are indifferent between information provision
in period 0 and information acquisition in period 1. We can therefore in the fol-
lowing restrict without loss of generality to equilibria where (on equilibrium path)
information is solely provided in period 0.
Since no incarnation wants to know less than his successor, each incarnation
will acquire full information himself whenever the successor would do so. As an
immediate consequence, the time-independent strategy of always acquiring full in-
formation regardless of the current belief forms a Markov perfect equilibrium.7
Corollary 3.2. For any subgame starting at any time t ≥ 0 the Markov strategy
of a full information signal
SF =
s1, θ < 1βC ,s2, θ ≥ 1βC ,
for all beliefs F constitutes a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Besides the full information equilibrium, there may be a plethora of other po-
tential equilibria. In the following, I am looking for the regulator-preferred Markov
perfect equilibrium, and argue that it arises natural the context of our model.
7Formally, full information cannot be attained, since the state space is continuous, whereas
we restrict the signal space to be finite. However, since the action space is only binary, the
full information outcome can be replication with a binary signal (see Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011)). Indeed, take the cut-off signal that displays s1 if and only if θ ≤ 1βC . This signal induces
the consumer to make the full information consumption choice to consume whenever θ > 1
βC
— independently of further information realization. In the following, whenever I refer to a full
information signal, one may think of this signal.
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The ability to support information provision by the regulator without further
learning as an equilibrium depends on the ability to punish deviations to this infor-
mation policy by future incarnations. Since any punishment has to be sequentially
rational, it turns out that the maximum punishment to deviations from the equi-
librium path is given by the full information subgame.
Lemma 3.3. For any t ≥ 0, the Markov perfect equilibrium of the subgame starting
time t + 1 which minimizes the utility of self-t is given by the full information
equilibrium, where each self-s for s ≥ t+1 for every belief chooses a full information
signal.
The equilibrium in Proposition 3.1 where the regulator has full control over
information can be sustained with costless consumer learning if the one time gain
from acquiring a preferable information structure does not exceed the loss from
being stuck in the full information equilibrium afterwards. Proposition 3.2 gives
precise conditions when this is the case.
Proposition 3.2. 1. There is a preferred Markov perfect equilibrium with cost-
less learning in which the only learning takes place at t = 0. The regulator
provides a cut-off signal
S =
s1, θ < y,s2, θ ≥ y.
The consumer always consumes if S = s1 and always abstains if S = s2.
2. The cut-off y and the consumption decisions coincide with those in Proposi-
tion 3.1, where the regulator has full control over information, if and only if
the optimal cut-off in Proposition 3.1 satisfies
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]]
≥ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
. (3.1)
3. Otherwise, if condition (3.1) is not satisfied then y is uniquely determined by
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]]
= δ
1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
.
Welfare is strictly higher than under full information and strictly higher than
in the case of Corollary 3.1, where the consumer at time t = 1 chooses the
signal structure.
The intuition for the threshold y is depicted in Figure 3.2.
On equilibrium path, the consumer does not exert learning at any t, and con-
sumes according to signal S whenever θ < y. If some consumer incarnation deviates
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Figure 3.2: Gain and Loss of a Deviation from Self-t’s Perspective
and acquires additional information at some time t then all subsequent selfs s > t
will acquire full information, and accordingly consume whenever θ < 1βC . The
solid line represents the (δ-undiscounted) per period utility of self-t from such a
consumption choice in all periods s > t. Compared to abstention for θ > y on
equilibrium path, self-t obtains each period s > t a discounted loss proportional to
the light grey shaded area. He will find this deviation profitable only if the sum of
these discounted losses are exceeded by the one time gain of the deviation in period
t. The most profitable deviation is full information, as it allows the best informed
consumption choice. The dashed line depicts self-t’s utility from full information in
period t. The one time gain for self-t compared to the utility on equilibrium path
is depicted by the dark grey shaded area, where self-t consumes whenever θ < 1βC .
While there are many other Markov perfect equilibria for the regulator’s signal
in period 0 (including the full information equilibrium), the described equilibrium is
not only welfare maximizing, but also arises naturally in this context. The informa-
tion signal in period 0 can be regarded as an incentive compatible recommendation
of a default option by the regulator: All consumer incarnations find it optimal to
take the information as given and base their consumption decision on the implied
recommendation.8
Next, we look at sufficient conditions for the distribution to satisfy condition
8In this sense, by the choice of the information signal, the social planner coordinates consumers
on one chosen equilibrium, as it is common in the mechanism design literature.
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3.1 for the optimal cut-off y, so that the outcome under full information control
and in the PMPE under costless learning coincide.
Recall from Proposition 3.1 that the optimal threshold y under full information
control satisfies y ∈ [ 1C , 1βC ]. Consequently, E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1βC ]] is in [ 1C , 1βC ] with the
exact value depending on where the prior distribution on [ 1C ,
1
βC ] has most of its
mass. Intuitively, in order to satisfy
E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]] ≥ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
,
the density of the prior must not be too fast decreasing on [ 1C ,
1
βC ]. Note that
the condition only depends on β and C in so far as they define the range [ 1C ,
1
βC ]
in which the density must not decrease too fast. The following Corollary puts
a bound on δ for priors that are nondecreasing in this range, which includes the
natural benchmark of a uniform prior.
Corollary 3.3. If the prior is nondecreasing on [ 1C ,
1
βC ], and δ ≥ 12 , then Condition
3.1 in Proposition 3.2 is satisfied and the PMPE with costless learning coincides
with the equilibrium with full informational control as described in Proposition 3.1.
As one can interpret δ as the discount due to a common market interest rate
between two consumption decisions, this condition is easily satisfied.
More generally, a sufficiently high δ always relaxes Condition 3.1, made precise
in the following Corollary.9
Corollary 3.4. For any prior distribution there exists a δ < 1 such that for all
δ ∈ [δ, 1] Condition 3.1 in Proposition 3.2 is satisfied and the PMPE with costless
learning coincides with the equilibrium with full informational control as described
in Proposition 3.1.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I showed how a paternalistic social planner can use information de-
sign to persuade consumers with quasi-hyperbolic preferences to better consump-
tion decisions. The optimal information signal takes the remarkably simple form
of a cut-off signal, which can be easily implemented by the use of threshold-based
recommendations or certified labels.
The results provide intuitive benchmarks for the novel perspective of using
information design as a paternalistic policy.
9Note that this is not immediate as the value of the externality C depends on δ.
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The are several natural ways to extend this baseline model, including informa-
tion cost for information acquisition, consumer na¨ıvete´ about their present bias, or
consumer heterogeneity in the degree of present bias.
Altogether, this chapter may be regarded as a starting point for interesting
future research.
3.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let S be the signal structure chosen by the regulator, let
G(θ, s) be its joint distribution on [0, 1] × S. Since the consumer has no access
to further information at t ≥ 1, a strategy for the consumer consists of a sequen-
tially rational consumption decision x(s) ∈ {0, 1} for all signal realizations s ∈ S.
Sequential utility maximization requires
x(s) =
1, βCE[θ|s] < 1,0, βCE[θ|s] ≥ 1.
The regulator’s problem is to find an F0-consistent signal structure (S,G) which
maximizes total discounted utility from the consumer’s consumption decision
U0((S,G)) =
βδ
1− δ
∫
(θ,s)∈[0,1]×S
x(s)(1− Cθ)dG(θ, s). (3.2)
This problem is a classical persuasion problem as defined in Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011) with continuous state space [0, 1]. In Proposition 3 of their Web
Appendix they show that an optimal signal exists for such persuasion problems.
Further, according to their Proposition 1, we can restrict to information signals
S = {s1, s2}, where realization s1 induces consumption, while realization s2 induces
abstention.10 Let from now S = {s1, s2} with distribution G(θ, s) be an optimal
F0-consistent signal structure.
First, we show that S can be described by a cut-off y ∈ [ 1C , 1βC ) such that the
realization is s1 if and only if θ < y. Suppose this is not the case. Due to the
strictly positive density of the prior distribution, there exists by the intermediate
value theorem some unique y ∈ [0, 1] such that P(S = s2) = P(θ > y). We show
that the cut-off signal which displays s1 if and only if θ ≤ y improves upon S.
10The logic is very similar to the revelation principle. Whenever different signal realizations
lead to the same action, we can instead use the signal structure, where the consumer cannot
distinguish among these, without changing his optimal action. One can therefore assume without
loss of generality that any signal structure has (at most) as many states as the action space.
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Since
P(S = s2, θ ≤ y) = P(S = s2)− P(S = s2, θ > y)
= P(S = s2)−
(
P(θ > y)− P(S = s1, θ > y)
)
= P(S = s1, θ > y),
we have
E[θ|S = s2] = 1P(S = s2)
∫
θ∈[0,1],S=s2
θdG(θ, s)
=
1
P(S = s2)
(∫
θ≤y,S=s2
θdG(θ, s) +
∫
θ>y,s∈S
θdG(θ, s)−
∫
θ>y,S=s1
θdG(θ, s)
)
<
1
P(S = s2)
(
P(θ ≤ y, S = s2)y +
∫
θ>y,s∈S
θdG(θ, s)− P(θ > y, S = s1)y
)
=
1
P(S = s2)
∫
θ>y,s∈S
θdG(θ, s)
=
1
P(θ > y)
∫
θ>y
θdF0(θ)
= E[θ|θ > y].
Consequently, the consumer abstains for θ > y under the cut-off signal, whenever
he abstains for S = s2 under signal S. Analogously, one can show that since
E[θ|S = s1] > E[θ|θ ≤ y], the consumer consumes for θ ≤ y under the cut-off signal
whenever he consumes for S = s1 under signal S. Plugging this decision rule into
the regulator’s objective (3.2), and using E[θ|S = s1] > E[θ|θ ≤ y], we see that the
regulator’s utility under the cut-off signal
U0 =
βδ
1− δ
∫
θ≤y
(1− Cθ)dF0(θ)
=
βδ
1− δ P(θ ≤ y) E[1− Cθ|θ ≤ y]
=
βδ
1− δ P(S = s1)
(
1− CE[θ|θ ≤ y])
>
βδ
1− δ P(S = s1)
(
1− CE[θ|S = s1]
)
=
βδ
1− δ
∫
(θ,s)∈[0,1]×{s1}
x(s)(1− Cθ)dG(θ, s)
= U0((S,G))
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exceeds her utility under S.
We have shown that the optimal signal is a cut-off signal. To determine the
optimal threshold y, recall that the regulator prefers abstention for any θ ∈ [ 1C , 1βC ),
and the consumer abstains for all θ > y if and only if E[θ|θ > y] ≥ 1βC . Therefore,
the optimal y satisfies
min
{
y ∈
[ 1
C
,
1
βC
)∣∣∣E[θ|θ > y] ≥ 1
βC
}
.
Consequently, whenever E[θ|θ ≥ 1C ] ≥ 1βC the constraint is not binding and
we get the boundary solution y = 1C . Otherwise the constraint binds, thus
E[θ|θ > y] = 1βC . Finally, since the optimal signal induces abstention on [y, 1] with
y < 1βC whereas full information induces abstention on
1
βC , self-0’s utility under
the optimal cut-off signal strictly exceeds his utility under full information.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Utility of self-t from consumption with risk type θ is
Ut(θ) = (1− βCθ) + βδ(1− Cθ) + βδ2(1− Cθ) + ...
=
(
1 +
βδ
1− δ
)
− β
1− δCθ.
It follows that Ut(θ) ≥ 0 if and only if(
1 +
βδ
1− δ
)
≥ β
1− δCθ,
thus if and only if
θ ≤ (1− δ) 1
βC
+ δ
1
C
.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 3.1, where
we replace ‘regulator’ with ‘self-1’ and the regulator’s objective U0((S,G)) by self-
1’s objective
U1((S,G)) =
∫
(θ,s)∈[0,1]×S
x(s)
((
1 +
βδ
1− δ
)
− β
1− δCθ
)
dG(θ, s).
In particular, the optimal signal is a cut-off signal, which aims to induce the most
possible abstention for types θ ≤ (1 − δ) 1βC + δ 1C as calculated in Lemma 3.1.
Consequently, the optimal cut-off y satisfies
min
{
y ∈
[
(1− δ) 1
βC
+ δ
1
C
,
1
βC
)∣∣∣E[θ|θ > y] ≥ 1
βC
}
,
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and the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We start by defining the collapse of two signal structures.
Let S be an F -consistent signal structure with distribution G. For some signal
realization sk ∈ S let F˜ = G(·|sk) be the posterior distribution. Further, let S˜ be
an F˜ -consistent signal structure with distribution G˜. The collapse of S and S˜ is
the signal structure with signal space S = (S\{sk})t S˜ and a joint distribution on
([0, 1]× S,B([0, 1]× S)) defined via
P(θ ≤ θˆ, s = sˆ) =
PG(θ ≤ θˆ, s = sˆ), sˆ ∈ S\{sk},PG(s = sk)PG˜(θ ≤ θˆ, s = sˆ), sˆ ∈ S˜.
Note that acquiring first S and then S˜ whenever the signal realization is s˜ is
equivalent to acquiring the collapsed signal of S and S˜.
Consider now a Markov perfect equilibrium and denote for the consumer’s
Markov strategy with SF the signal choice for belief F . (If the consumer decides
not to learn for belief F , take SF as the trivial signal consisting of only one state.)
Let t > 1. Since in equilibrium self-t with belief Ft acquires SFt , this implies that
the consumer weakly prefers the distribution of posteriors from SFt to belief Ft.
However, since self-t− 1 acquires SFt−1 rather than the collapse of SFt−1 with SFt
implies that the consumer weakly prefers belief Ft to the distribution of posteriors
from SFt . It follows that the consumer is indifferent between belief Ft and the
distribution of posteriors from SFt .
Consequently, self-t− 1 with belief Ft−1 is indifferent between acquiring SFt−1
and acquiring the collapse of SFt−1 with SFt , whereas self-t is indifferent between
acquiring SFt and the trivial signal.
Suppose now SFt is relevant for t > 1. As self-t is indifferent between SFt
and the trivial signal, this implies that self-0 is not. Since by Assumption 3.1
self-t always chooses self-0’s preferred action whenever he is indifferent between his
preferred action, self-0 strictly prefers self-t to acquire signal SFt rather than the
trivial signal. This implies he prefers future incarnations to have the distribution
of posteriors from SFt rather than belief Ft. In particular, self-0 prefers self-t − 1
to acquire the collapse of SFt−1 with SFt rather than his equilibrium choice SFt−1 .
Since self-t − 1 is indifferent between the two, but chooses SFt−1 , Assumption 3.1
is violated, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. By Corollary 3.2, the full information strategy for the sub-
game starting at t + 1 is a Markov perfect equilibrium. Take any other Markov
perfect equilibrium of the subgame. Lemma 3.2 states that for the game starting
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at t = 1 with belief F1 there is only information acquisition at t = 1 in equilibrium.
By renaming the time index it is immediate that for any subgame starting at t+ 1
with belief Ft+1 there is only information acquisition at time t+ 1 in equilibrium.
Consequently, the consumption decision is identical at all times starting at t + 1.
Let SFt+1 with distribution G be the information signal at t + 1 and x(s) be the
consumption decision for signal realization s. Then the expected utility for self-t+1
generated by his own consumption decision under signal SFt+1 is
vt+1 =
∫
(θ,s)∈[0,1]×S
x(s)(1− βCθ)dG(θ, s),
whereas the undiscounted per-period utility for self-t + 1 generated by all future
selfs consumption decision is
v =
∫
(θ,s)∈[0,1]×S
x(s)(1− Cθ)dG(θ, s).
Call accordingly
vFIt+1 =
∫
θ∈[0,1]
x(s)(1− βCθ)dFt+1(θ)
and
vFI =
∫
θ∈[0,1]
x(s)(1− Cθ)dFt+1(θ)
the respective expected per-period utilities from full information for self-t+ 1 with
belief Ft+1. Since the equilibrium strategy must give at least the same utility as
deviating to full information and consuming the full information consumption level
forever, we have
vt+1 + β(δv + δ
2v + ...) ≥ vFIt+1 + β(δvFI + δ2vFI + ...).
Since full information enables self-t + 1 to his best consumption choice we have
vFIt+1 ≥ vt+1 and therefore
β(δv + δ2v + ...) ≥ β(δvFI + δ2vFI + ...).
Now, on the left-hand side we have the utility for self-t generated by the equilibrium,
whereas on the right-hand side we have the utility for self-t generated by the full
information equilibrium, which shows that no equilibrium for the subgame starting
at t+ 1 can induce a lower utility to self-t than the full information equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. By Lemma 3.2 we can restrict to Markov equilibria with
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no information acquisition on equilibrium path at any time t ≥ 1. Such an equilib-
rium induces the same consumption decisions for all incarnations of the consumer.
A necessary condition for a Markov strategy to be part of such a Markov perfect
equilibrium different to the full information equilibrium is that self-1 does not
benefit from deviating and acquiring a full information signal
S =
s1, θ < 1βC ,s2, θ ≥ 1βC .
Such a deviation would yield self-1 an expected utility of
U =
∫ 1
βC
0
(1− βCθ)dF1(θ) + βδ
1− δ
∫ 1
βC
0
(1− Cθ)dF1(θ).
Note that U depends on the updated belief F1, thus on the information realization
in t = 0.
Hence, a solution to the relaxed problem, where the regulator maximizes her
utility under the constraint that self-1’s utility without further information acqui-
sition weakly exceeds U for all realizations of the regulator’s signal, puts an upper
bound on the utility which the regulator can achieve in any Markov perfect equilib-
rium. We determine this upper bound and show how to implement it as a Markov
perfect equilibrium.
First, note that for a solution to the relaxed problem we can again restrict at-
tention to signals in SF0 = {s1, s2} where realization s1 induces consumption and
s2 induces abstention. Indeed, if self-1 does not benefit from full information for
any signal realization of a signal S = {s1, ..., sn}, then he does not benefit from full
information in expectation for all states that induce consumption or abstention.
Consequently, combining all realizations that induce consumption and all that in-
duce abstention into one each yields a signal with two states for which self-1 does
not benefit from full information.
Next, we show that a solution to the relaxed problem exists, if and only if
it exists in the class of cut-off signals. Let S be a non-cutoff signal and let again
y ∈ [0, 1] be such that P(S = s2) = P(θ > y). We showed in the proof of Proposition
3.1 that the cut-off signal which displays s1 if and only if θ ≤ y improves the
regulator’s utility compared to S and does not change consumer’s consumption
decision. Moreover this cut-off signal improves self-1’s utility: The cut-off signal
changes the consumer’s action from abstention to consumption whenever S = s2
and θ ≤ y. It changes the consumer’s action from consumption to abstention
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whenever S = s1 and θ > y. Since
P(S = s2, θ ≤ y) = P(S = s2)− P(S = s2, θ > y)
= P(S = s2)−
(
P(θ > y)− P(S = s1, θ > y)
)
= P(S = s1, θ > y),
the same share of consumers consume under S and under the cut-off signal. Hence
consumption utility is the same, however as lower risk types consume, the expected
externality cost is lower. Consequently, self-1 finds it suboptimal to deviate to full
information under the cut-off signal, whenever he finds it suboptimal under the
signal S. This concludes the argument that for a solution to the relaxed problem
we can focus on cut-off signal.
Before we determine the optimal cut-off as the solution to the relaxed problem,
we show how such a cut-off signal in t = 0 can be implemented as a Markov
Perfect equilibrium, in which no consumer acquires information at t > 0. Call Fθ>y
and Fθ<y the posterior distributions from the cut-off signal, i.e. the two possible
beliefs at t = 1. Consider the Markov strategy where the consumer acquires full
information whenever he has a belief inconsistent with the regulator’s signal, and
no information otherwise, i.e.
SF =

S(θ) =
s1, θ < 1βC ,s2, θ ≥ 1βC , F /∈ {Fθ>y, Fθ<y},
{s}, F ∈ {Fθ>y, Fθ<y}.
Together with the sequentially optimal consumption decisions (consume when-
ever the belief is Fθ<y or Fθ< 1
βC
) this is indeed a Markov perfect equilibrium:
Whenever the belief is not Fθ>y or Fθ<y, each self-t anticipates that the next in-
carnation will acquire full information, so he finds it optimal to do so himself, as
full information allows the best myopic consumption choice. Whenever the belief
is Fθ>y or Fθ<y, any information acquisition would end up in a different posterior
and would induce full information next period. As the best myopic deviation would
be full information, such a deviation would generate at most a utility of U , and is
therefore by assumption not improving upon the trivial signal.
Having established that the PMPE consists of a cut-off signal from the regulator
and no consumer information acquisition on equilibrium path we now calculate the
optimal cut-off y.
Consider a cut-off signal with cut-off y which induces abstention for θ > y, i.e.
E[θ|θ > y] ≥ 1βC . Such a signal induces a Markov perfect equilibrium for the above
Markov strategy if and only if no consumer incarnation benefits from deviating to
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full information, ie. if and only if
∫ 1
βC
0
(1−βθC)dF0(θ)+ βδ
1− δ
∫ 1
βC
0
(1−θC)dF0(θ) ≤
∫ y
0
(1−βθC)dF0(θ)+ βδ
1− δ
∫ y
0
(1−θC)dF0(θ),
or differently if and only if∫ 1
βC
y
(1− βθC)dF0(θ) + βδ
1− δ
∫ 1
βC
y
(1− θC)dF0(θ) ≤ 0.
Rearraning this condition yields
∫ 1
βC
y
(
1 +
βδ
1− δ
)
dF0(θ) ≤ β
1− δ
∫ 1
βC
y
θCdF0(θ).
Dividing by F0(
1
βC )− F0(y) gives us
1 +
βδ
1− δ ≤
β
1− δE
[
θ
∣∣∣θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]]
C,
which is equivalent to
E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]] ≥ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
.
Since the regulator prefers abstention for all types θ > 1C the optimal cut-off
therefore satisfies
min
{
y ∈
[ 1
C
, 1
] ∣∣∣ E[θ|θ > y] ≥ 1
βC
, E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]] ≥ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
}
.
Since the optimal cut-off from Proposition 3.1 where the consumer cannot ac-
quire information satisfies
y = min
{
y ∈
[ 1
C
, 1
] ∣∣∣ E[θ|θ > y] ≥ 1
βC
}
,
our optimal cut-off coincides with the cut-off in the case where the consumer
cannot acquire information if and only if
E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]] ≥ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
,
which shows 2.
Otherwise, if
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E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]] < δ
1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
then the constraint E[θ|θ > y] ≥ 1βC for the optimal cut-off is not binding. The
optimal cut-off is then given by
min
{
y ∈
[ 1
C
, 1
] ∣∣∣ E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]] ≥ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
}
.
Since for y = 1C we have
E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]] ≤ E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]] < δ
1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
,
the minimum is not at the boundary 1C , but has an inner solution satisfying
E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]] = δ
1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
.
In particular, this implies that
y > δ
1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
,
where the right hand side is by Corollary 3.1 the self-1 preferred cut-off. Thus,
abstention is higher on [ 1C ,
1
βC ] than under the self-1 preferred signal from Corollary
3.1 and induces higher welfare.
Proof of Corollary 3.4. By assumption, the prior has a continuous and strictly pos-
itive density f0, thus attains its minimum f
min
0 and its maximum f
max
0 on [0, 1].
Let δ =
fmax0
fmax0 +f
min
0
. Rearranging yields
fmax0
fmin0
=
δ
1− δ .
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To save notation denote in the following E[θ|θ ∈ [ 1C , 1βC ]] with E. Now, we have
P
(
θ ∈
[
1
C
,
1
βC
])
E =
∫ 1
βC
1
C
θf0(θ)dθ
⇔
∫ E
1
C
(E− θ)f0(θ)dθ =
∫ 1
βC
E
(θ − E)f0(θ)dθ
⇒
∫ E
1
C
(E− θ)fmax0 dθ ≥
∫ 1
βC
E
(θ − E)fmin0 dθ
⇔ δ
1− δ
∫ E
1
C
(E− θ)dθ ≥
∫ 1
βC
E
(θ − E)dθ
⇔ δ
1− δ
E− 1C
2
≥
1
βC − E
2
⇔ E ≥ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
.
Since y ≥ 1C , this implies that for all δ > δ we have
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]]
≥ E ≥ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
≥ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
Proof of Corollary 3.3. If the prior is nondecreasing on [ 1C ,
1
βC ], then the condi-
tional distribution of the prior on [ 1C ,
1
βC ] first order stochastically dominates the
uniform distribution on [ 1C ,
1
βC ]. Hence, for all δ ≥ 12 we have
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ ∈ [y, 1
βC
]]
≥ E
[
θ
∣∣∣θ ∈ [ 1
C
,
1
βC
]]
≥ 1
2
1
C
+
1
2
1
βC
≥ δ 1
C
+ (1− δ) 1
βC
.
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